Think Tanks in Poland: Policy Experts at the Crossroads by Stasiak, Dorota (Dr)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers 
Vo
lu
m
e 
2 
Is
su
e 
1 
(2
01
4)
 
 
Polish Journal of Political Science. Working Papers 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
Editorial Board 
Clifford Angell Bates Jr., University of Warsaw 
Stephen Brooks, University of Michigan 
Paolo Pombeni, University of Bologna 
Bohdan Szlachta, Jagiellonian University in Krakow 
Tomasz Żyro, University of Warsaw 
 
Editor: 
Jarosław Szczepański 
 
Associate Editors 
Kamil Aksiuto 
Przemysław Biskup 
Aneta Marcinkowska (Statistics) 
Iwona Miedzińska 
Krystian Pałyska 
Maciej Sadowski 
Łukasz Smalec 
Jan Szczepanowski 
Marta de Zuniga 
 
 
Original version: e-book 
Visit our site: www.pjps.pl 
Submit your paper: submit@pjps.pl 
  
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Łukasz Smalec 
European Military Capabilities. History, Assessment, Practice and 
Perspectives p. 5 
 
Kamil Aksiuto 
Beyond Utilitarianism? Beyond Democracy? p. 37 
 
Jan Szczepanowski 
A Melting Pot in the United States of Europe? The Modern 
Concept of Multiculturalism reviewed by Feliks Koneczny and 
Oswald Spengler p. 61 
 
Dorota Stasiak  
Think Tanks in Poland: Policy Experts at the Crossroads p. 95 
 
Iwona Miedzińska 
The position and role of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – selected issues p. 141 
  
  
 
Łukasz Smalec 
Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw  
Centre for International Initiatives 
 
European Military Capabilities. History, Assessment, Practice and 
Perspectives 
 
Abstract 
The last decade was marked by the European growing ambition of 
an active role in the security sphere inter alia increasingly 
important role as an actor in crisis response missions. Taking into 
account conclusions coming from the last European Council session, 
the article analyses a progress that has been made in the 
development of European military capabilities essential to conducting 
independent full-scale out of area operations since the foundations of 
the ESDP. Attention will be given to the efforts undertaken to 
generate such capabilities at the EU level, their results and the 
challenges ahead. On the basis of these considerations the Author 
believes that ten years of the CSDP (former ESDP) have brought a 
few and above all only minor successes. As Zbigniew Brzezinski 
aptly pointed out: “Europe remains a junior geopolitical partner to 
the United States in the semi unified West”. 
Keywords: European military capabilities, CSDP, out of area 
capabilities, European Union 
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Introduction 
The last decade was marked by the growing activity of the European 
Union (EU) in dealing with security threats. It began to play an 
increasingly important role as an actor in crisis response missions 
dealing with both regional and global security challenges. This includes 
a broad spectrum of tasks ranging from crisis management, through 
conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction (the so called state- or 
nation-building) to peacekeeping missions. Bound by the foundation and 
further development of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after 
the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the EU has obtained new instruments in 
this field. Simultaneously we ought to take into consideration declining 
US interest in European affairs (the so called Pacific pivot), which 
might probably be even more important. Washington needs to make an 
effort to seek the balance between political commitments, military 
presence and fiscal efficiency on account of the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 (the global financial crisis). The so-called transatlantic partnership 
is at a crossroads in the face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Mounting 
pressures over defence budgets and an increasingly complex and 
uncertain security environment call for renewed efforts in European 
defence co-operation. Therefore, because of the highly irregular nature 
of the global environment, for the first time since the entry into force of 
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the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009), the European Council1 (19-20 
December 2013) held a debate concerning defence. 
This study is an attempt to assess the progress that has been 
made in the development of European military capabilities essential to 
conduct full-scale out of area missions. It seeks to give an overview of 
the efforts undertaken to generate military capabilities at the EU level, 
their results and the challenges that lie ahead. Aditionally, it outlines a 
number of points that ought to be taken into consideration when 
thinking about this issue. The presentation begins by describing the 
most important steps towards EU independent military capacity. I make 
an effort to determine whether the EU member states possess relevant 
capabilities for conducting high-intensity out of area missions without 
significant American military support. The aim of this study is to shed 
light on the issue of European military capabilities, in particular its 
shortcomings and development. Then, I turn my attention to the military 
capabilities-driven division of labour works in Afghan and Libyan 
missions and on the basis of these considerations try to better present 
the complexity of the issue analysed during above mentioned European 
Council meeting. 
1. European Military Capabilities – A Glance at History 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) European security 
architecture changed dramatically. Two Balkan crises in the early and 
late 90’s exposed the European inability to gather essential forces and 
                                        
1 European Council meetings are called European Union Summits too. 
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carry out autonomous expeditionary missions. The first one – the Balkan 
war (1991-1995) revealed European weaknesses. It was the first but not 
the last bitter pill which demonstrated that European armed forces were 
ill-equipped for crisis management missions. The “hour of Europe” 
revealed the old continent’s inability to deal with its own problems. 
American troops played a key role in resolving the conflict while 
European units had only little impact on its final outcome. Similarly, the 
second – the conflict in Kosovo and further NATO Allied Force air 
operations in 1999 confirmed American predominance and drew 
attention to the disparities in power between old allies. In fact, the 
second armed conflict demonstrated that the military gap between the 
United States and its European allies even deepened2.  
                                        
2 “European Military Capabilities”, 2007. EU Briefings May 2007, p. 1-3; D. 
Keohane, 2003. “Needs An Avant-Garde for Military Capabilities. Briefing Note 
Europe”, New Ideas for a New Europe.  
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/briefi
ng_militarydk-5642.pdf (Accessed Jannuary 19, 2013), p. 1; J. P. Weiskopf, “Out 
of Area – Out of Sight? What Role do Gender and Peace Policy Aspects Play in 
the European Security Policy?” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03701.pdf 
(Accessed December 20, 2012), p. 12; S. Larrabee, 2012. “Unfinished Business in 
Europe.”, In The Agenda for the EU-US Strategic Partnership, ed. Álvaro de 
Vasconcelos. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 10-14; “EU 
military Capabilities – some European Troops , but not yet a European 
Army.” 2010. In EU Crisis management: Institutions And Capabilities In 
The Making eds. E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, Rome: English Series 19, 
Quaderni IAI, p. 12; J. Morel, A. Cameron. 2010. “The EU and Defence 
Capabilities: Charting the Course”. In European Defence Capabilities No 
Adaptability without Co-operation, ed. L. Simon,, London: Royal United 
Services Institute, Whitehall, p. 2; S. Bowman, 1996. “Bosnia: U.S. Military 
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1.1. First Steps towards Efficient European Military 
Capabilities  
The above-mentioned European weakness led to the 
strengthening of bilateral French-British cooperation culminating in 
the St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 – a cornerstone for further 
cooperation in the area of security and defence at the EU level. Two 
strongest European forces/armies – the only European nuclear powers, 
called other EU members to establish “the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed by credible forces, the means to decide to use them and 
a readiness to do so”3. Next year at the European Council meeting in 
Cologne (3-4 June 1999), the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) was formally conceived. It was important, but merely the first 
step of the European Union on the road to playing a more important 
and independent role on the international stage in the field of security. 
To achieve this goal “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
                                                                                                
Operations December 16, 1996”, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/93-056.htm 
(Accessed December 20, 2012).  
3 “Common Security and Defence Policy. Development of European Military 
Capabilities”. 2011. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%
20capacites%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf, (Accessed January 3, 2013), 
p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, 2010. “EU Military Capabilities – Some European 
Troops , but not yet a European Army” In The Making eds. E. Greco, N. 
Pirozzi, S. Silvestri, Rome: English Series 19, Quaderni IAI, p. 12; “Military 
Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?”. 2012. http://www.isis-
europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_322_esr46-
military-capabilities.pdf (Accessed December 22, 2012), p. 1. 
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action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises, without prejudice to actions by NATO”4.  
During the European Union Summit in Helsinki (December 2000), 
member states decided to set themselves a target of creating the 
European Rapid Reaction Force known as the Helsinki Headline Goal 
(HHG). Immediately it should be noted that the purpose of the HHG 
was but a formation of a pool of national armed forces of up to 60,000 
personnel (15 brigades) at the disposal of the EU, on a basis of voluntary 
involvement5. The units would be able to fully deploy within less than 
60 days and remain in the theatre of operation for up to one year. These 
forces were supposed to undertake the so-called Petersberg tasks6 
adopted in 19927. Based on arrangements of the Washington NATO 
Summit (1999), a joint declaration was announced on 16 December 2002. 
                                        
4 D. Braddon, 2010. “Operational, Structural and Procurement Expenditure in 
European Defence Budgets: Trends, Patterns and Reform.” In European 
Defence…, p. 15.  
5 This would involve the need to ensure additional units (at least 60 thousands) 
together with the associated military equipment in order to ensure the regular 
troop rotations in theatre.  
6They include: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, 
tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-
making and post-conflict stabilization. 
7 Common Security and Defence Policy. Development…, op.cit., p. 2; C. 
Major, Ch. Mölling, op.cit., p. 12-13; J. P. Weiskopf, op.cit., p. 11-12; 2004. “EU 
as Military Actor—The Role of the European Defence Agency” 
http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~tiexm/conference_paper/session5/Fuchang.pdf 
(Accessed January 9, 2013), p. 8.  
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Next year an agreement was adopted on 11 March 2003, which became 
the cornerstone of official WEU8-NATO cooperation, known as the 
“Berlin Plus” formula. What is most important in this arrangement is the 
EU getting access to NATO planning capacity and the establishment of a 
list of its assets and capabilities available for use in EU-led missions9. 
The next step on the road to greater independence of Europe in 
this field was an adoption of the European Security Strategy Draft for a 
Global Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World in 
June 2003. This document, recognizing the importance of new security 
challenges, was a symbolic step. In that strategy the EU’s High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy – Javier 
Solana would rather concentrate on presenting security challenges and 
threats than analysing them. Another crucial shortcoming and probably 
                                        
8 The acronym WEU stands for Western European Union.  
9 “Berlin Plus Agreement”. 2009. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/b
erlinplus_en.pdf (Accessed December 29, 2012); “The EU-NATO Berlin Plus 
Agreements.” 2009. Paris: European Security and Defence, p. 1-2, 
http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/4/documents/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus[1].p
df, accessed on: 9.01.2013; European Military Capabilities…, op.cit., p. 3; J. 
Herz, 2009. “Military Capabilities – A Step Forward in ESDP?”, http://www.isis-
europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_322_esr46-
military-capabilities.pdf (Accessed December 22, 2012), p. 1; J. Morel, A. 
Cameron, op.cit., p. 2; J. P. Weiskopf, op.cit., p. 10-15; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, 
op.cit., p. 12-13; E. Gross, 2009, “EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: 
Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories” http://transatlantic.sais-
jhu.edu/publications/books/Preventing_Conflict_Managing_Crisis/03.Gross.pdf 
(Accessed December 20, 2012), p. 38. 
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even more important one, is the lack of resources essential to implement 
the strategy10.  
1.2. European Military Capabilities. Lessons Learned from 
Early Failures 
Following the failure of the first, a new Headline Goal 2010 was 
approved at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels (17-18 June 
2004). During the meeting EU member states announced that they want 
to “commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and 
decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole 
spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty”11. The 
key element of the new HG 2010 was the presence of high-readiness 
forces based on the concept of Battlegroups. This shift from the HHG to 
the HG 2010 was a step forward. Its aim was the removal of the 
capability shortfalls of the previous initiative. While the HHG was 
focused on quantitative targets, the new HHG presented a more 
qualitative approach. The HG 2010 included the following scenarios of 
military actions: separation of parties by force; stabilisation, 
reconstruction and military advice to third countries; conflict prevention; 
evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance12. 
                                        
10 J. P. Weiskopf, op.cit., p. 19; J. Morel, A. Cameron, op.cit., p. 2. 
11 Common Security and Defence Policy. Development…, op.cit., p. 2; C. 
Major, Ch. Mölling, op.cit., p. 12-14; J. P. Weiskopf, op.cit., p. 12-16.  
12 J. Herz, op.cit., p. 1; J. Morel, A. Cameron, op.cit., p. 2; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, 
op.cit., p. 12-14; J. P. Weiskopf, op.cit., p. 10; Fu-chang Chang, op.cit., p. 8; 
“Headline Goal 2010 Approved by General Affairs and External Relations 
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The “Battlegroup Concept“, prepared on the basis of a common 
Franco-British proposal, had its origins in the experience of the Artemis 
Mission (2003) and was approved during the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in 2004. Finally, in November that year European member 
states decided to establish 13 Battlegroups which were meant to acquire 
full operational capability by 2007. These highly trained battalion-sized 
units (up to 1,500 soldiers) which would be deployable within 15 days 
and sustainable in the field for up to 120 days will make up the core of 
EU high readiness forces and be able to undertake autonomous rapid 
response operations. This concept presented a significant improvement 
of existing European capabilities13.  
Last but definitely not least, the Declaration on Strengthening 
Capabilities was adopted by the EU Council in 2008. This declaration 
outlined ambitious goals for the EU inter alia: the capacity to conduct 
two major simultaneous operations involving up to 10,000 troops for 2 
years, two rapid response operations using EU Battlegroups, a civilian-
military humanitarian assistance operation for up to 90 days and one 
civilian mission involving up to 3,000 experts. Despite the EU taking 
steps in the right direction, one major important problem has not 
changed, the gap between European available and desired capabilities 
remained significant14.  
                                                                                                
Council on 17 May 2004 Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 
2004”. 2010. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf 
(Accessed December 20, 2012), p. 1. 
13 Fu-chang Chang, op.cit., p. 6. 
14 C. Major, Ch. Mölling, op.cit., p. 18-19; J. Herz, op.cit., p. 2-3. 
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2. Current European Military Capabilities. Assessment  
The idea of establishing a European Army had its origins in the 
European Defence Community – the idea was born in the early 50’s and 
finally abandoned in 1954. After more than two decades since the end of 
the Cold War, the European military capacity for expeditionary missions 
has remained unsatisfactory15. Shortly after a quick and overwhelming 
victory in the Iraqi Freedom Operation, this military campaign was 
hailed as a model of modern combat intervention. Even then there were 
a few different opinions in this matter. Professor Boleslaw Balcerowicz 
rightly pointed out that it could be considered as such only in relation to 
operations involving the US military because of the shortcomings of 
European military capabilities. A similar position was represented inter 
alia: by Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri16.  
We should not forget, that the EU as a whole takes the second 
place in the ranking of the largest defence spenders in the world. 
However, merely counting money spent on defence does not provide an 
accurate outlook of the range of the military capability gap. Qualitative 
comparisons are more important and confirm American undoubted 
dominance of the many cutting-edge dual-use military technologies, 
which are supported by a leading information technology sector and 
                                        
15 B. Seibert. 2010. „The Quest for European Military Capabilities.” In European 
Defence…, p. 8.  
16 B. Balcerowicz. 2006. Siły zbrojne w państwie i stosunkach 
międzynarodowych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, p. 138-139; 
Fu-chang Chang, op.cit., p. 3. 
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governmental research and development programs. The crux of existing 
differences reflect the opinion of political science analysts from the 
European Union Center of North Carolina. They believe that “European 
forces are said to possess only 10% of US capabilities for 60% of the US 
budget”17. Simultaneously, they admit that “Europe’s defence industry 
maintains considerable capabilities and European armies are gradually 
acquiring many of the same types of high-tech equipment and munitions 
that are employed by the US”18. Nevertheless, this progress remains 
rather slow, particularly with regard to military equipment required for 
high intensity out of area missions. The effectiveness of the EU 
approach to security issues was undeniably compromised by the lack of 
a common position concerning foreign policy priorities among members. 
Actually, merely 10% of European soldiers are ready for rapid response 
missions overseas. Consequently, the EU will probably play second 
fiddle in the US-led out of area operations, concentrating on peace-
support operations19.  
 
 
 
                                        
17 European Military Capabilities…, op.cit., p.1-2.  
18 European Military Capabilities…, op.cit., p.1-2.  
19 European Military Capabilities…, p. 1-7; S. Coonen, 2006. “The Widening 
Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it 
Matter?”  
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/06autumn/coonen.pdf 
(Accessed December 22, 2012), p. 77. 
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2.1. Different Views or Ways of Response 
A brief look at the strategy of the EU and the United States of 
America takes into consideration Robert Kagan's observation that the 
allies have different/ disjointed views of the world20. This difference lies 
elsewhere, namely in the ways of response to these challenges. In spite 
of an existing military gap between the United States and Europe, the 
“old continent” possess a comparatively significant military capability 
and, what is more important, a will to use it. Since 2003 – a critical point 
for transatlantic partnership as well as intra-European relations ( the 
split was so severe that some observers doubted the survival of the 
perennial alliance as a result of American preparations to war with 
Iraq), the EU had conducted 28 operations, both civilian (20) and 
military (8). All of which differed very much (greatly) from Operation 
Allied Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom 
or the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, lightly armed 
EU-forces consisted of EU-Member States units are able to conduct “low-
intensity“ Petersberg missions. On the basis of previous experiences, it 
is possible to point out existing European challenges. From the military 
point of view, European combat units are not developed well enough to 
lead full scale armed missions. In such operations they played only a 
secondary role. The majority of the most sophisticated and at the same 
time decisive weapons used in the latest wars were U.S. assets. The EU 
                                        
20 Cf. A. I. Zakharchenko, 2007. The EU and U.S. Strategies against Terrorism 
and Proliferation of WMD: A Comparative Study, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: 
George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies. 
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still does not possess military capabilities required for today’s combat 
operations. In order to attain a larger global range, European forces will 
have to acquire sufficient capabilities at least in the following areas: 
strategic lift; aerial refuelling; C4SIR (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Surveillance, Intelligence, and 
Reconnaissance Systems); ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) and power projection (inter alia 
Stealth Aircrafts and Bombers, Strategic Lift and Air-to-Air Refuelling) 
and PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions). In addition to the above-
mentioned shortcomings, there is another concern – an unprecedented 
fragmentation and intra-European duplication of weapon systems among 
European states which are not compatible (roughly 125 different types of 
weapon systems exist, in particular in the area of air-force there are at 
least 40 systems) with each other21. 
As Jeffrey Bialos aptly pointed out: “American and European 
forces do not necessarily require the same types of capabilities to be 
interoperable, but at a minimum they must be able to communicate with 
each other via secure modes in order to exchange information”22. As a 
matter of fact, European military capabilities do not lag behind. An 
undeniable gap in military capabilities does not prevent interoperability 
                                        
21 Fu-chang Chang, op.cit., p. 9; S. Coonen, op.cit., p. 70-79; E. Gross, op.cit., p. 
38; “EU Common Security and Defence Policy.” 2012. 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSEXR/EX4.htm (Accessed January 10, 2013); 
O. Croci, A. Verdun, 2006. “Security Challenges in the 21st century: EU, USA, 
and Canadian Approaches.” http://canada-europe-dialogue.ca/events/Workshop-
June12-2006/Croci-Verdun19-June2006.pdf (Accessed December 29, 2012), p. 1. 
22 S. Coonen, op.cit., p. 77. 
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between allied forces. Moreover, the cost of demanding European 
investments in the C4ISR systems is not overburdening or even 
overwhelming. However, several important steps should be taken. 
Europeans ought to modernize their forces with aforementioned 
networks, develop new weapons systems, among them modern 
precision-strike munitions, WMD defence, mobility and logistic support 
assets. These existing disparities have constituted a sui generis division 
of labour wherein the USA plays the main role during “hot phases” of 
operations and conflicts, while in the meantime European forces become 
more visible in the stabilisation and reconstruction phase. Each 
“partner” will focus on those military missions which bring them a 
comparative advantage. Already during the Balkan crises the vast 
majority of combat units was provided by the American superpower. 
The EU had taken over command of the operation from NATO when the 
focus has shifted to the state-building tasks23. In the public debate this 
qualified division of labour is described by the phrase: “Americans 
making dinner and the Europeans washing the dishes”24. In this context 
it is worth recalling one more quite often quoted motto: "US combat, the 
UN feeds, the EU pays"25. 
                                        
23 S. Coonen, op.cit., p. 77-8; “Affordable Defense Capabilities for Future NATO 
Missions. A National Defense University Special Report”. 2010. 
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/NATO_Affordable%20Defense%20Cap
abilities.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2012). 
24 S. Schmemann, 2003. “Some Are Cooks, Some Are Dishwashers.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/books/some-are-cooks-some-are-
dishwashers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (Accessed December 30, 2012). 
25 Fu-chang Chang, op.cit., p. 1. 
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2.2. CSDP. Main Achievements and Plans for the Future 
More than ten years of the ESDP (renamed the CSDP after the 
Treaty of Lisbon) have brought a few and above all only minor 
successes which were overshadowed by a lot of unfulfilled promises. 
The main achievement is definitely the EU Battlegroups initiative, which 
significantly intensified military cooperation among EU states. Since 2007 
two such units have always been on stand-by. Although the 
Battlegroups are presented as the most significant success of the CSDP, 
we ought to be aware of some important limitations. First of all, the EU 
has never deployed any Battlegroup so far. No one is able to assess the 
level of interoperability between European forces and their effectiveness 
in dealing with combat tasks. Second, the EU member states used to 
prefer creation of ad hoc coalitions in accordance with the Donald 
Rumsfeld principle: “missions define coalitions”. Unfortunately, in these 
cases military lessons learned from the field are few and seldom taken 
into account, because of the reluctance of state actors. Thirdly, the 
Battlegroups are capable to conduct only low-intensity small crisis 
management missions. If the EU has ambitions to conduct full scale 
operations, these battalion-sized units ought to be extended to include 
more troops and encompass diverse capabilities (military units 
exhibiting various levels of readiness)26. 
Being meticulous is essential to indicate that the EU is far from 
the capability hubris. On the contrary its member states are aware of 
                                        
26 D. Braddon, op.cit., p. 25-26; J. Herz, op.cit., p. 2-3; C. Major, Ch. Mölling, 
op.cit., p. 15-16. 
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their weakness. Concerning the existing military gap between Europe 
and the US numerous essential analyses have been conducted and 
several measures have been found in early 2000. Even a cursory 
analysis of European ambitious plans allows to draw at least two 
conclusions (see the table below). On the one hand, these armaments 
programmes were prepared on the solid foundation of European 
military shortcomings and desired strategic capabilities. On the other 
hand, they were just as ambitious as unrealistic in a given time frame27. 
Table 1. Selected European Armaments Programs 
Program Description Number of 
Units 
Deliverie
s 
Current progress 
A400 M Transport 
aircraft 
180-planned (in 
fact 160 ordered 
by EU members 
so far28)  
2009-2010 Successfully completed the 300 
hours of F&R (Function & 
Reliability) flight-testing in 
December 201229. 
Eurofighte
r 
Combat 
aircraft 
620-planned 
(almost 500 
ordered by EU 
members so far)  
2003-2015 First Eurofighter entered to service 
in August 200330. 
Tiger Attack 
helicopter 
180-planned 2003-2008 Significant delays in deliveries, 
program is still underway 
NH-90 Transport 300-planned From 2006 The total volume of orders 
                                        
27 European Military Capabilities…, op.cit., p.5-6; “Strength in Numbers? 
Comparing EU Military Capabilities in 2009 with 1999”. 2009. Paris: European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 4. 
28 C. Gauntier, 2012. “A 400M Program Update 2012.” 
http://www.slideshare.net/robbinlaird/a400-m-program-update-2012 (Accessed 
January 10, 2013).  
29 “Airbus Military A400M Completes Critical Flight-Test Phase.” 2013. 
http://www.airframer.com/news_story.html?release=19966 (Accessed Jannuary 
10, 2013).  
30 “A History of the Programme.”. 2013. http://www.eurofighter.com/eurofighter-
typhoon/programme/history.html (Accessed Jannuary 10, 2013). 
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helicopter exceeded 570 machines, both NH90 
TTH transport version (Tactical 
Transport Helicopter) and sea one 
NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter)31 
Future 
Carrier 
Aircraft 
carriers 
(United 
Kingdom/Fra
nce) 
3-planned 2012-2014 HMS Queen is to be launch in 2016 
and HMS Prince of Wales in 201832, 
the future of second French aircraft 
carrier - PA2/CVF future in doubt33 
Source: “European Military Capabilities”, 2007. EU Briefings May 2007, p. 6 
 
I recognize that both the EU as a whole as well as its members 
will not possess the capability essential for conducting successful major 
combat operations without significant US support. Given budgetary 
pressures, some countries will have to reallocate funds and other 
resources from defence to other sectors. On the other hand, it could be 
a strong incentive to strengthen European cooperation on a larger scale 
on the basis of the cooperation between the UK and France. Ambitions 
are always huge, here the I will confine myself to one issue which is the 
establishment of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) which is 
to achieve full operating capability in 201634.  
                                        
31 „Portugalia zrezygnowała z NH90”. 2013. 
http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=8089 (Accessed Jannuary 10, 2013).  
32 “Stępka pod Prince of Wales”. 2013. 
http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=6215&q=lotniskowce%20brytyjskie(
Accessed Jannuary 10, 2013). 
33 “France’s PA2/CVF Carrier Project Stalled Until Whitepaper Verdict” 2013. 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/france-steaming-ahead-on-pa2cvf-carrier-
project-01621/ (Accessed January 10, 2013).  
34 “Britain and France Will Share Aircraft Carrier to Combat Defence Cuts, Says 
Admiral.” 2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394185/Britain-France-
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3. European Military Capabilities in Practice . European 
Military Contribution to the Out of Area Operations in 
Afghanistan and Libya 
The Libyan operation and the final stage of ISAF’s Mission in 
Afghanistan were conducted in a completely new security environment. 
After years of unprecedented dominance, the current position of the US 
has significantly changed and now looks a lot more complicated. 
Washington’s freedom of strategic action is constrained by its prolonged 
combat commitment to Afghanistan (2001-2014?), the trauma of the Iraqi 
war (2003-2011, somewhat reminiscent of the so-called “Vietnam 
syndrome”), never ending budgetary problems and last but not least the 
situation in the Middle East, especially the “New Deal” in the field of 
security and the rising tide of anti-Americanism in Gulf area35.  
3.1. “Afghan War” 
Americans still bear the majority of the burden of the Afghan 
mission both in terms of the number of soldiers and military equipment 
in the Afghan theatre as well as expenditures. This does not mean that 
                                                                                                
share-aircraft-carrier-combat-defence-cuts-says-admiral.html (Accessed January 
10, 2013); New Declaration Agreed at the UK-France Summit; Production for the 
United Kingdom.” 2012. 
http://www.targetlock.org.uk/typhoon/production_uk.html (Accessed Jannuary 
10, 2013); “Business Plan 2012-2015 Ministry of Defence 31 May 2012”. 2012. 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/MOD-2012-Business-
Plan.pdf (Accessed Jannuary 10, 2013).  
35 Testimony of Admiral..., op.cit. p. 82.  
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the EU members participating in the operation behave as “free riders”. 
Over the last few years the EU member states made significant 
contributions to US-led combat operation in Afghanistan. Europeans 
compose roughly 90% of the 40,000 non-US troops serving in 
Afghanistan. Three out of six regional commands and several of the 29 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are led by European 
allies36.  
However, merely counting troops does not provide an accurate 
outlook of the European contribution to the operation. US European 
Command (EUCOM) actively supported European allies during their 
preparations for troop deployment to Afghanistan. Americans provided 
them pre-deployment training programmes, including among others: C-
IED (Counter-Improvised Explosive Device) procedures, 
counterinsurgency intelligence analysis tailored to the Afghan security 
environment, operations of MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) 
and HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles) and 
finally – battalion-level counterinsurgency exercises. This is not the end 
of US military allies with equipment essential for the ISAF Mission in 
Afghanistan inter alia: communications systems, night vision devices 
and above mentioned C-IED systems (i.e. robots). The main objectives of 
these activities were to provide links and increase the level of 
interoperability between the allied forces being deployed and US forces 
in Afghanistan. Moreover, EUCOM ensured essential logistical capability 
to dislocate European troops and equipment to and from Afghanistan. In 
                                        
36 Testimony of Admiral..., op.cit. p. 82. 
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spite of all European shortcomings, its contribution to the ISAF Mission, 
including troops, equipment and funding, is critical to meeting its current 
goal, which is the transition of security responsibility in Afghanistan by 
201437. 
Despite the fact that CSDP structures and instruments are not 
militarily involved in Afghanistan, the majority of EU member states are. 
In most cases their participation in the mission meant to incur significant 
efforts. At the very beginning their governments sometimes had to 
struggle to legitimize their decision to participate in this operation. 
During the mission they suffered from a lack of significant successes and 
a few losses, inter alia the need to extend the military presence of their 
troops and a quite significant number of casualties. Summing up, it has 
reduced both readiness and the willingness for future large-scale 
expeditionary missions38. 
3.2. Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector 
The crucial role of Europe both in terms of basing, military 
infrastructure and force contributions was even better visible during the 
operations in Libya (Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector). However, 
also in this case USA played an important role. Initially, Washington 
decided to take a seemingly secondary role in the intervention. 
American support for UN resolutions 1970 and 1973 was not 
unconditional and excluded an involvement of US ground troops. The 
                                        
37 Testimony of Admiral..., op.cit. p. 4-9, 89.  
38 C. Major, Ch. Mölling, op.cit., p. 18.  
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coalition agreed on US leadership without debate, because of the 
necessity of unity of the command (joint command) and essential 
capabilities to command and control (C2) as well as the significant 
logistical support of this air campaign39. 
The operations in Libya provide at least one important example 
of current European military capabilities to conduct out of area crisis 
response operations. The USA was forced to step in to refill European 
weapon stocks. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates chided the allies for 
having an insufficient inventory of weapons. Maybe it overshadowed 
real EU power a bit, but at the same time shed light on their huge 
deficits. The Libyan air campaign has brought additional important 
conclusions and lessons for the future. Gen. Stephane Abrial, the 
Commander of Allied Command Transformation had no doubt that 
European air forces “could not have performed to the same level of 
effectiveness without heavy contribution from the US". Moreover, the 
Libyan case also highlighted European shortages in terms of C2, 
logistical support, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance equipment 
and assets essential to carry out combat as well as rescue tasks. Without 
US participation it would be difficult to ensure the same interoperability 
and coordination as has been seen during the Libyan operations. 
                                        
39 J. Tirpak, 2011. “Lessons from Libya.” Air Force Vol. 94, No. 12, p. 34-36, 
http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2011/December%202011/1211libya.p
df, accessed on: 10.01.2013; Testimony of Admiral..., op.cit. p. 1, 10-11, 31, 84; 
E. Fojón, ‘2011. “‘Odyssey Dawn’ – Beyond Libya” 
http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2011/03/30/odyssey-dawn-beyond-
libya/ (Accessed January 10, 2013). 
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Conclusions of these short deliberations seem to be quite simple. 
European states have to develop their own military capabilities 
independently – without US involvement40.  
On the other hand, the Libya missions are another example of 
the weakness of transatlantic partnership not only on the line of US-
Europe, but within the EU as well. The Iraqi crisis had proven that the 
transatlantic alliance is not an automatic mechanism. When it comes to 
Libya, while France and the United Kingdom were the founders of 
Security Council Resolution 1973, Germany abstained during voting and 
did not participate in the Libyan air-campaign. Moreover, we ought to 
remember about limited Italian contribution. The above mentioned 
examples highlight that the CSDP exist only in theory and the level of 
distrust as well as difference in foreign policy among allies remain 
meaningful41.  
4. The European Council (19-20 December 2013) – Step 
Forward or nihil novi 
 Since the above mentioned St. Malo Declaration a few 
initiatives have been presented, but the CSDP played undoubtedly 
merely a secondary role in the European integration. It is lagging far 
behind EU’s economic and trade dimensions42.  
                                        
40 E. Fojón, op.cit.; J. Tirpak, op.cit., p. 34-38. 
41 E. Fojón, op.cit. 
42 Cf. P. Schellinck, 2013. “Conclusions of the European Council 19/20 December 
2013.” http://www.european-news-
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Antonio Missiroli from the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS) thinks that the final conclusions coming from the last 
European Council meeting “can be considered a major step forward, 
also because it indicates a way forward, with explicit deadlines and 
responsibilities for reviewing, researching, and reporting”43. It is worth 
noting that the first part of Conclusions of the European Summit is 
devoted to CSDP. Almost ten out of twenty six pages of the document 
are dedicated to the security dimension of EU’s integration44. However, 
merely counting pages does not provide an accurate outlook of the 
importance attributed to the CSDP in the EU. Despite the hopes for a 
breakthrough text of the declaration it was not announced45. In the 
document the EU leaders highlighted the importance of defence and 
recognized the CSDP as a tool, which enhances “the security of 
European citizens and contributes to peace and stability in our 
neighbourhood and in the broader world”46. Moreover, it seems that 
they appropriately assessed the currently rapidly evolving European 
security environment. Due to restrictive austerity measures European 
countries are not able to develop desirable military capabilities. Another 
important issue is indicated in the document – the fragmentation of 
                                                                                                
agency.de/special_interest/conclusions_of_the_european_council_19_20_december
_2013-57332/, (Accessed Jannuary 15, 2014).  
43 A. Missiroli, 2013. “European Defence – to be Continued.”, EU ISS Alert No 
44, p. 1. 
44 European Council 19/20 December 2013. 2013. “Conclusions EUCO 217/13”, 
p. 1-10. 
45 A. Missiroli, op.cit., p. 1. 
46 European Council 19/20 December 2013…, op. cit., p. 1. 
 Polish Journal of Political Science. Working Papers 
 
28 
 
European defence markets, which undermines its competitive strength 
on the global scale47.  
European leaders introduce a fairly optimistic assessment of 
progress in areas connected with the CSDP. They emphasize that 
nowadays EU contribution to the stabilization of the current security 
architecture inter alia: “7000 staff in 12 civilian missions and four 
military operations” and “EU unique ability to combine, in a consistent 
manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence 
to finance, trade, development and justice”48. I only partially agrees with 
the optimistic assessment and would like to emphasize once again that a 
gap between available and desired capabilities remained significant.  
Regardless of the optimistic opinions on past achievements in the 
field of the CSDP, European leaders are aware of de facto their 
secondary role in the “old continent’s” security architecture. The only 
way to ensure stability and security in Europe is close EU collaboration 
with NATO, as described by the authors, “in a spirit of mutual 
reinforcement and complementarity its global (?)“49. Moreover, they 
called for improvement and aptly pointed out priority actions connected 
with the CSDP. They have identified three main so called axes: 
• increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; 
• enhancing the development of capabilities; 
                                        
47 European Council 19/20 December 2013…, op. cit., p. 1-2. 
48 European Council 19/20 December 2013…, op. cit., p. 3. 
49 European Council 19/20 December 2013…, op. cit., p. 3. 
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• strengthening Europe's defence industry50. 
I share the pessimism of A. Missiroli who summarized the 
Conclusions of the last European Council in these words: “European 
Council meeting may disappoint those who expected either a big leap 
forward in terms of political ambition or a series of specific and 
quantified decisions to be implemented right away”51. It would be very 
difficult to recognize the final document as a revolution in EU military 
affairs. However, the last European Council meeting gives a few reasons 
for hope and optimism52. 
 
Nevertheless, a great deal of truth remains in Frederick the 
Great's statement: "Diplomacy without military force is like music 
without instruments”. Thus, European states have to develop military 
capabilities which allow them to perform a full catalogue of combat 
missions or tasks – from high-intensity, through nation- and state-
building military operations to traditional peace-keeping tasks. In 
essence, European states are forced to cooperate more than they used to 
in the past53.  
I attempted to outline the crucial issue connected with a 
development of European military capabilities to conduct full-scale 
                                        
50 European Council 19/20 December 2013…, op. cit., p. 2. 
51 A. Missiroli, op.cit., p. 1. 
52 A. Missiroli, op.cit., p. 1. 
53 D. Braddon, op.cit., p. 24; F. Burwell, D. Gompert, L. Lebl, J. Lodal, W. 
Slocombe, 2005. Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU 
Security Architecture. Washington: Atlantic Council of the United States, p. 7-
8.  
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combat missions. Conclusions coming from these considerations allow to 
draw several important findings. Firstly, apart from an adoption of 
specific institutional solutions more than ten years of the CSDP (former 
ESDP) have brought a few and above all only minor successes. As 
Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out: “Europe remains a junior geopolitical 
partner to the United States in the semi unified West”54. Secondly, there 
is a fairly broad judgment that a significant military combat or even 
crisis management operation, especially one that must be sustained over 
time and at a substantial distance from home bases, will require US 
involvement through NATO. Thirdly, only limited military capabilities 
do not prevent EU from playing a significant role in meeting new 
security challenges. A Venusian Europe possess assets essential for 
peace-keeping and state-building tasks, which is complementary to 
American assets. Finally, the EU will be able to play the role of one of 
the most influential perhaps even number two or three on the globe in 
terms of military power. Prerequisite for an implementation of this 
optimistic scenario is a closer integration, especially in the field of 
security55. The document analyzed above adopted on December 2013 by 
the European Council seems to be merely the first, but significant step 
of the EU on the road to becoming an important global military power. 
                                        
54 Z. Brzeziński, 2012. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global 
Power, New York: Perseus Distribution, p. 53.  
55 S. Coonen, op.cit., p. 67-68; F. Burwell, D. Gompert,L. Lebl, J. Lodal, W. 
Slocombe, op.cit., p. 7-8; A. I. Zakharchenko, op.cit., p. 6.  
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Beyond Utilitarianism? Beyond Democracy? 
J. S. Mill on Representative Government 
 
Abstract1 
Classical utilitarianism was one of the first comprehensive, modern 
doctrines which provided justification for the establishment of 
democracy. John Stuart Mill is usually considered to be an heir of 
this intellectual tradition, yet his mature political theory exhibits 
many significant diversions from the utilitarian orthodoxy. In this 
essay I undertake a venture of examining what is the upshot of these 
differences for political philosophy. I argue that J. S. Mill’s account as 
exemplified in his late work Considerations on Representative 
Government cannot be squared with the classical utilitarian 
approach. This is because the former is almost exclusively 
preoccupied with the educational aspect of politics while in the 
latter, mainly due to its hedonism and consequentialist structure, 
these educational concerns are almost altogether absent. I also tackle 
a distinct yet related question in what sense, if any, the younger’s 
Mill theory of government can be considered democratic?   
Keywords: civic education, democracy, elitism, liberalism, J. S. Mill, 
participation, representative government, utilitarianism. 
  
 
                                        
1 Paper prepared for the presentation at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political 
Theory 2013, Manchester, 4-6th of September 2013. 
 Polish Journal of Political Science. Working Papers 
 
38 
 
*(All the quotes from the works of J. S. Mill used in this paper were 
taken from J. M. Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, Vol. 1-33, Toronto 1963-1991, thereafter referred to as CW) 
 
 In this paper I will attempt to tackle two distinct, yet closely 
intertwined subjects. As these are rather complex issues I hope to be 
forgiven for not always being able to maintain the clarity of distinction 
between them. What I can do to avoid confusion is at least to sketch the 
outline of my task at the very beginning.  
 First of all, it seems that there is something troublesome, or 
perhaps even embarrassing, about J. S. Mill’s attachment to the tradition 
of classical utilitarianism. Ever since his life-time critics hardly wasted 
any opportunity to point out to the elements in his thought which seem 
to be strikingly inconsistent with that tradition (or with what that 
tradition is usually thought to be).2 But even more tellingly, the 
uneasiness of fitting the younger Mill into the utilitarian landscape has 
been consistently, though to some extent tacitly, confirmed by his 
sympathizers, especially in the second half of the XXth century. Many 
examples could be given, yet for the sake of brevity I hope it will suffice 
to note that one of the most distinguished contemporary Mill’s scholars 
described him as: “perhaps a more consistent liberal than a utilitarian”.3 
                                        
2 One does not need to look any further that James Fitzjames Stephen’s Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity which was published in 1873, the year Mill died. 
3 A. Ryan, Popper and liberalism in: A. Ryan, The Making of Modern 
Liberalism, Princeton 2012, p. 416. Arguably sir Isaiah Berlin was the first 
highly significant author who tried to deny Mill’s utilitarian lineage in his 
seminal essay J. S. Mill and the Ends of Life. Among other scholars who are 
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There are many reasons, both philosophical and non-philosophical, for 
this suspiciousness arisen by utilitarian tradition.4 Nevertheless, I will 
not dwell on this subject. What I intend to do instead, is to trace some of 
the implications of the suggested tension in the field of political theory.  
 That utilitarianism fathered one of the first comprehensive 
defenses of democracy in modern times is a cliché. Some more or less 
broadly utilitarian arguments for democracy are still very much alive 
nowadays, though admittedly this position is perhaps less popular 
among philosophers than in commonsensical discourse and political 
practice. What is perhaps less of a cliché is to ask whether there is 
actually only one utilitarian theory of democracy? This brings us back 
to the question of utilitarian credentials of J. S. Mill. For there can be no 
doubt that his account of democratic government is significantly different 
from the one given by his utilitarian mentors. So it seems that there are 
only two possible solutions. We might assume that J. S. Mill’s account 
exemplifies a distinct version of utilitarian argument for democracy, 
perhaps achieved by enlargement and/or refinement of the views of 
Bentham and James Mill. Then it would seem that we have at least two 
competing, distinct and comprehensive utilitarian arguments for 
democracy. On the other hand, we might as well argue that J. S. Mill 
was not consistently utilitarian and neither is his theory of democracy. 
But then it still remains to be determined precisely what kind of 
democracy is he arguing for? In fact we might even wonder whether it 
                                                                                                
sympathetic to Mill and showed similar intent to Berlin’s one might also 
mention: J. Plamenatz and C. L. Ten. 
4 Excellent overview of these issues can be found in J. Skorupski, Introduction: 
The Fortunes of Liberal Naturalism in J. Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Mill, Cambridge 1998, p. 16-30. 
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is democracy at all?! Anyone familiar with Mill’s Considerations on 
Representative Government (for brevity sake thereafter referred to 
simply as Representative Government) knows that this is a perfectly 
legitimate question to ask. I presume that being classified as a 
representative of  “democratic Platonism”5 is hardly a compliment 
nowadays, so democratic credentials of the younger Mill also deserve a 
closer scrutiny. 
 It is with these two questions that I will be mainly preoccupied 
here. Whether J. S. Mill’s political theory transcends the limits of any 
conceivable form of consistently utilitarian view? And whether it can be 
consistently described as democratic? 
I. The Classical Utilitarian Approach 
 Let me start with a brief summary of the classical utilitarian 
approach to democracy. The most instructive and concise, if at the same 
time also the most notorious, exemplification can be found in James 
Mill’s essay Government. It was regarded by contemporary utilitarians 
as a textbook of political theory, and indeed most of it shortcomings are 
due to the textbook-like simplicity and bluntness of the crucial 
assumptions.6  The older Mill’s reasoning starts from the premise of 
universal selfishness. He maintains that it is: “(...) a law of human nature, 
that a man, if able, will take from others anything they have and he 
                                        
5 See D. E. Miller, J. S. Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought, Cambridge 
2010, p. 187. 
6 R. Harrison, Democracy, London 1993, p. 94-95. 
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desires (...)”.7 And what every man ultimately desires is either his 
pleasure or absence of pain. At the same time James Mill also takes for 
granted the main ideas of Ricardian political economy. Since we desire 
pleasure and want to avoid pain and the natural resources are limited 
we need labour and the goods that it can produce. But given the selfish 
nature of men it follows that everybody, if only given the opportunity, 
would try to enslave the others and make their labour subservient to 
satisfaction of his desires. Thus, in order to ensure the security of 
persons and property we need a government. But the problem remains, 
for people invested with political power will surely use it to their own 
advantage if unchecked. James Mill’s answer is that only representative 
democracy can provide us with a solution. First of all, it makes 
government accountable to people through periodic elections. Hence it 
is in the interest of the rulers to satisfy the interests of the greatest 
number of voters unless they want to be thrown off the office. Secondly, 
the satisfaction of the interests of the greatest number is precisely what 
general interest consists in and, consequently, what should be the aim of 
the good government. From these two corollaries taken together it does 
seem to follow that representative democracy with universal suffrage is 
the only form of government consistent with the greatest happiness 
principle. Well, it does not, at least according to James Mill. He 
famously stated that since the interests of some are included in the 
interests of others there is no need to enfranchise women (whose 
interests are included in those of their fathers and husbands) and 
children (by which he meant people under 40). This argument from the 
                                        
7 J. Mill, Government in T. Ball (ed.), James Mill: Political Writings, Cambridge 
1992, p. 9. 
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“inclusion of interests” is obviously strikingly fallacious by James Mill’s 
own standards. After all, if anything follows from his psychological 
assumptions, it is that every individual might in normal circumstances 
be the best judge of his own interests, but certainly not that he should 
be freely allowed to decide for others about theirs. Thus Thomas 
Macaulay in his famous critique of Mill’s essay found it all too easy to 
wonder: “Is then the interest of the Turk the same with that of the girls 
who compose his harem? Is the interest of the Chinese the same with 
that woman whom he harnesses to his plough?”.8 Interestingly enough, 
at the same time the older Mill does not argue in favor of property 
qualifications. Many of his contemporaries feared that broadening of the 
suffrage would result in expropriation of the rich by the poor. However, 
Mill did not treat it as a real danger and for a very specific reason. As 
Ross Harrison pointed out, in general there were two ways of “not being 
too nervous” about democracy at the beginning of the XIXth century, 
virtue and deference.9 While the former was more consistently explored 
by Bentham, James Mill contented himself mainly with the latter. He 
believed that the poor would defer to the example of the middle class.10 
After all, it is no accident that his essay ends with a small invocation of 
the virtues of the middle class, the one which is the most industrious, 
reasonable and far-sighted.11 There is another contradiction in this 
argument. If the interests of the poor are included in those of the middle 
class there is no need to enfranchise the former. However, if they have 
                                        
8 T. B. Macaulay, Mill on Government in T. Ball (ed.), James Mill..., p. 291. 
9 R. Harrison, Democracy, ibid., p. 102-104. 
10 Originally Mill spoke of a “middle rank”. J. Mill, Government, ibid., p. 41-42. 
11 Ibid., p. 41-42. 
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their own, separate interests they indeed should be given the right to 
vote. But then there is no reason to suppose that they would and should 
accept so willingly the enlightened guidance of their betters. 
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind this brand of elitism advocated 
by James Mill, as it might be useful to compare it later with the one of 
his son.    
 Leaving aside the peculiarities of the older Mill’s approach, his 
argument represents a clear, if crude, utilitarian case for democracy. 
According to classical utilitarianism, which is a consequentialist and 
teleological doctrine, there is no inherent moral value in democracy 
itself. It is valuable only insofar as it secures the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number. Consequently, there is nothing uniquely legitimate 
in democratic constitution of government itself. For a utilitarian the 
question whether particular government is lawful is a factual question, if 
it can secure habitual obedience of the vast majority of population then 
it certainly is.12 Obviously, utilitarians like Bentham and James Mill 
believed that representative democracy in the end happens to be the 
only form of government which passes the test of general interest. 
However, this is an empirical assumption which might be proven false. 
For instance, the development of new technologies seriously puts into 
question the traditional utilitarian rationale for representative democracy 
which basically amounts to the claim that direct democracy is simply 
impracticable in large, modern and economy-oriented societies. 
Similarly, should we stumble upon a different form of political 
arrangement which happens to be cheaper and/or more effective than 
                                        
12 A. Ryan, Mill and Rousseau: Utility and Rights in A. Ryan, The Making..., 
ibid., p. 353-355. 
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democracy (be it direct or indirect) there would be no reason for a 
convinced utilitarian to stick to the latter. It is just an instrument of 
general interest and like every instrument it can be substituted with a 
better one. 
John Stuart Mill’s Reaction 
 Much has been said about J. S. Mill’s complicated relationship 
with his father and how it influenced his attitude towards the classical 
utilitarian school. It is enough here to mention that the son was familiar 
with Macaulay’s devastating critique of his father’s essay. It certainly left 
a lasting mark on his intellectual development and possibly contributed 
to the famous mental crisis of his youth. Initially traumatic loss of faith 
in orthodox Benthamism eventually helped Mill to emerge as an original 
and independent thinker. Mindful of the lessons of the past, he grew 
aware of the need to develop and refine classical utilitarian theory, also 
in the field of political theory. Thus J. S. Mill’s own take on the subject, 
his seminal essay Representative Government should be read as a 
response both to his father’s Government and to Macaulay’s critique of 
the latter. Using his favourite approach of trying to marry the parts of 
truth existing in contrasting views Mill wanted to come up with an 
account of government that would not be so excessively deductive and 
abstract as his father’s. In keeping with the main intellectual patterns of 
the XIXth century he aimed at more historical approach as well as the 
one which would adopt a more complex, less egoistic and mechanistic 
psychology. At the same time he did not want to wholly concede 
Macaulay’s point about inductive method of science of politics. 
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  Let me now proceed to the details of J. S. Mill’s analysis. He 
agrees with his father that representative government is an “ideally best 
form of government”[CW, XIX, p. 398]. However, it does not mean that it 
is possible at every stage of history of a given society. In On liberty 
Mill famously stated that “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government 
in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement and 
the means justified by actually effecting that end” [CW, XVIII, p. 224] 
and he maintained this view in Representative Government. Both 
savage and slaves are not fit for political liberty, they might eventually 
become so, but first certain conditions, like basic respect for the rule of 
law and the habit of solving differences by discussion, must be met. The 
great mistake of classical utilitarianism was to think of representative 
democracy as if it was equally applicable and desirable in the case of 
modern, western societies and “for Bedouins or Malays” [CW, XIX, p. 
394], while according to Mill the best that the latter could hope for was 
to find some “Akbar or Charlemagne”[CW, XVIII, p. 224]. Mill might not 
have been of a high opinion of Bedouins or Malays but nevertheless his 
whole argument presupposes that representative government has a 
privileged status, other political arrangements are acceptable only 
insofar as they prepare people for it. In this restricted sense 
representative government is precisely an ideal one. Why is it so 
according to J. S. Mill? He offers two sorts of reasons, or to be more 
precise, two criteria by which every mode of government should be 
judged. The first criterion might be labeled as effectiveness and there 
seems to be little trouble with fitting it into utilitarian theory. The 
younger Mill argues that there are certain limits of effectiveness in 
management of state affairs that a despotic regime cannot surpass. The 
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reasons he gives to justify this judgment are all quite sound and, 
moreover, in accord with classical utilitarianism. Generally speaking 
everybody is the best judge and guardian of their own interests. 
Because of that any exclusion from having a say in matters of 
government is likely to result in the interests of the excluded being 
either ignored or misconceived by even the most well-meaning elites.13 
Yet, it is beyond doubt that the heart of J. S. Mill’s argument for 
representative government lies in the second criterion he puts forward. 
Following D. E. Miller we might label it as education14, but it is 
education in a broad sense of the term, understood as a development 
and refinement of people’s “moral, intellectual and active qualities” [CW, 
XIX, p. 390]. As Mill himself emphatically put it:  
“The first element of good government, therefore being 
the virtue and intelligence of the human beings 
composing the community, the most important point of 
excellence which any form of government can possess is 
to promote the virtue of intelligence of the people 
themselves” [CW, XIX, p. 390, emphasis added] 
                                        
13 J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government in CW, Vol. XIX, p. 
404-406. 
14 D. E. Miller, J. S. Mill..., ibid., p. 171-172. The distinction between what I call 
“effectiveness” and “education” criteria is also offered in slightly modified form 
by R. W. Krouse in the distinction between “two competeing visions of the 
underlying nature and purpose of social and political life”, between its 
“protective” and “educational” function. R. W. Krouse, Two Concepts of 
Democratic Representation: James and John Stuart Mill, “The Journal of 
Politics”, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 512-513. 
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Or to express the same thought in a slightly different manner, 
government should be judged primarily by “what it makes of citizens”, 
not only by “what it makes with them” [CW, XIX, p. 392].  
 One problem with Mill’s distinction between effectiveness and 
education is that he never seems to very seriously entertain an 
unpleasant thought that they might come into competition with each 
other. Since he assumes that representative government (at least in the 
long run) fares best in both dimensions, he can avoid discussing how 
much political liberty and education can be traded-off for how much 
effectiveness.15 However, I will not elaborate on this issue. Instead I will 
argue that the weight which he ascribes to the education of citizens, the 
“ethological” effects of government as he would have it, might be 
impossible to square with the traditional utilitarian account. 
 Perhaps one of the most astounding things about Representative 
Government from  contemporary perspective is how many benefits Mill 
expects to be secured by active involvement of citizens in public life. On 
this point he actually has more in common with the tradition of 
republicanism than classical utilitarianism, or with many varieties of 
XIXth century liberalism for that matter. Indeed, civic participation has 
been one of the great themes of republican thought. J. S. Mill similarly 
emphasizes that without it the improvement of people’s characters, their 
virtue and intelligence, is impossible. It is after all no accident that he 
describes government in a truly Tocquevillian manner as a “school of 
public spirit”.16 In a fashion characteristic for his whole thought he links 
here the enhancement of intellectual qualities with moral development 
                                        
15 Ibid., p. 171-172. 
16 J. S. Mill, Considerations..., ibid., p. 412. 
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so closely that they become almost inseparable. A mind devoted to 
public affairs has to show more activity and originality that the one 
which is deprived of this opportunity. And the moral improvement 
follows as well. Active citizenship prevents the rise of despotism, be it 
even a benevolent and a mild one, since people are much less likely to 
accept without any questioning the policies made for them by 
government. Nowhere is all of this more evident than in Mill’s extended 
praise of active (or energetic) character type over a passive one. 
Obviously, according to him the former is best promoted by 
representative government, while the latter naturally dominates under 
despotic regimes.17 Furthermore, participation also helps an individual to 
realize that he is a member of a broader community and this 
membership comes with certain duties. It enlarges sympathies of a 
common men so that they gradually start to stretch beyond the 
boundaries of family or class. An active citizen develops feelings of 
affection and responsibility for his fellow countrymen. The fact that he is 
called upon not only to vote once in every few years, but also to take 
upon himself some public function (at least from time to time) is the best 
cure for excessive individualism. It allows to overcome a narrow 
selfishness of life concentrated on the pursuit of material wealth and 
sectional interests. “In despotism - says Mill - there is at most but one 
patriot, the despot himself” [CW, XIX, p. 401]. But things are quite 
different under free, that is representative, government. 
                                        
17 Ibid., p. 406-410. 
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 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that participation 
occupies a central role in J. S. Mill’s account of representative 
government. He maintains that: 
“From these accumulated considerations it is evident, that 
the only government which can fully satisfy all the 
exigencies of the social state, is one in which the whole 
people participate; that any participation, even in the 
smallest public function, is useful; that the 
participation should everywhere be as great as the 
general degree of improvement of the community will 
allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable 
than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign 
power of the state.” [CW, XIX, p. 412, emphasis added] 
But since the realities of living in modern nation-state societies do not 
favor direct involvement of citizens in the making of all collective 
decisions, the only solution is to elect representatives. In this regard Mill 
is in accord with the views of his utilitarian mentors. Yet, the differences 
are much more pronounced and significant. In the classical utilitarian 
theory the goal of representative government is to achieve the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. Active citizenship can be valuable 
only insofar as it serves this goal. Indeed, it might be quite persuasively 
argued that too much public involvement from the citizens would be at 
the expense of economic prosperity.18 J. S. Mill’s approach is 
substantially different. As we already know, participation is supposed to 
                                        
18 J. Mill, Government, ibid., p. 7. 
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lead to the education of the people, to the improvement of their 
character. However, this is not a purely instrumental relationship. It is 
rather that education (in Millian sense) at least partially consists in the 
civic participation itself, in the active exercise of one’s intellectual, moral 
and practical capacities in public life. It might as well be put slightly 
differently. Classical utilitarians conceived of representative democracy 
as a set of political institutions which happens to best promote general 
interest. In the younger Mill’s case the end of representative government 
is for the people to attain the virtues of self-dependence and self-
government. And it would be strange indeed to claim that their active 
involvement in public matters is something entirely different from the 
self-dependence and self-government. 
 Let us now turn to the issue of J. S. Mill’s strong concern for the 
fate of minorities in democracy. This was not an important problem for 
the older generation of utilitarians. If they noticed it at all, their general 
answer was pretty straightforward, as in the case of Bentham’s criticism 
of the doctrine of natural rights. Sometimes the general interest requires 
that somebody has to lose in order to benefit the others. J. S. Mill 
disagreed. He feared that broadening of the suffrage will paradoxically 
leave many groups practically disenfranchised19, as their votes will be 
flooded by the votes of the working-class.20 In particular he was afraid 
                                        
19 It has to be said that Mill applied this argument against the background of the 
political realities of contemporary United Kingdom and United States with 
majoritarian electoral systems and few strong parties. 
20 Mill employs various terms to signify what we usually understand as working 
class. He speaks of: “labouring class”, “labouring classes”, “operative classes”. 
But in general the main division he identifies within modern, western societies 
is between “labourers” and “employers of labour”. This distinction is not a 
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that the enfranchisement of the masses will prevent the intellectual and 
moral elite21 from having a say in the matters of general interest. For 
him this kind of political arrangement did not deserve to be called 
anything else, but a false democracy - “a government of privilege in 
favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any 
voice in the State”[CW, XIX, p. 448]. This brings us to the second 
question posited by this paper. So far I have been consciously trying to 
avoid speaking of J. S. Mill’s theory of democracy, opting instead for 
more neutral term “representative government”. But it is now high time 
we turned to the question of how democratic his representative 
government actually is? 
J. S. Mill’s Elitism and Attitude Towards Democracy 
 Ross Harrison is to some extent right when he notes that if we 
move from Bentham and James Mill to J. S. Mill we notice a certain loss 
of confidence in democracy.22 Historical context is particularly important 
                                                                                                
purely economical one, but also based on the life-style and aspirations of social 
groups. On the one hand the category of labourers includes small employers of 
labour whose habits and tastes resemble those of working class, on the other 
highly-paid labourers and members of the professions belong to the same 
group as capitalists and possessors of inherited wealth. J.S. Mill, 
Considerations..., ibid., p.  447. 
21 Sometimes Mill does seem to suggest that these are in fact two distinct groups 
with no particular relation between them. But in fact education and moral 
excellence are so closely intertwined in Mill’s thought that these groups even if 
not identical are at least overlapping in a great degree. D. E. Miller, J. S. Mill..., 
ibid., p. 177-178. 
22 R. Harrison, Democracy, ibid., p. 108. I write “to some extent” because I do not 
completely share Harrison’s interpretation on this point. I hope to give reasons 
to justify my opinion at the very end of this paper. 
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here. Unlike many of their contemporaries classical utilitarians did not 
fear that the enfranchisement of masses would result in the spoliation of 
the rich by the poor. They remained optimistic for various reasons. 
James Mill thought that the poor would defer to the example of the 
middle class. Bentham was convinced that people are rational enough to 
recognize more often than not what is really in their interest in the long 
run and therefore they would not violate the security of property. The 
younger Mill was not so confident about it. He feared that one of the 
great dangers of democratization is the introduction of class legislation 
based on the short-sighted interest of numerical majority. The other 
danger is general mediocrity and low level of intelligence among the 
representatives of the people. Hence, he introduces certain elements of 
elitism into his theory to prevent those evils. That is not to say that 
elitism was altogether absent from classical utilitarianism, as exemplified 
in the case of James Mill.  But his son’s elitism is different and at the 
same time somewhat more explicit. 
 These elitist elements are scattered throughout J. S. Mill’s work. 
 He wants to leave room for expertise in democracy and thus he 
reserves for a parliament a purely deliberative and controlling function. 
The business of drafting legislation and administration is supposed to be 
reserved for trained specialists with parliamentary assemblies acting 
simply as watchdogs. He also excludes from voting not only illiterate, 
but also those who do not pay taxes and cannot support themselves.23 
                                        
23 Mill concedes that all exclusions from the franchise are an evil in themselves, 
but some are justified by a greater good they are supposed to secure. It is also 
worth noting that all the exclusions which he proposes are temporary in their 
nature. 
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This makes his position on suffrage rather curious, because on the other 
hand he argues for the enfranchisement of women, which at the time 
was nothing short of being radical. But the most important and 
controversial moment comes when Mill disconnects the universality of 
suffrage (granted the abovementioned exclusions) from the equality of it. 
Everybody should be ultimately given a vote, but some should be given 
more votes than the others. The reasons why Mill thinks so are clear 
enough. He wants to give more political influence to the moral and 
intellectual elite than their numerical strength would suggest. It should 
be remembered that according to him this group consists of the most 
far-sighted and unselfish individuals. Since the questions of general 
interest admit of the right answer, Mill assumes that members of his 
elite are simply better qualified to make such judgments. “Some are 
wise and some otherwise” as he put it elsewhere.24 Furthermore, he 
expects that if the wise win some seats in parliament they will be able 
to check the dangerous tendencies of democracy towards mediocrity 
and lack of competence. Due to their virtue and intelligence they will 
exercise a beneficial influence over parliamentary majority and balance 
competing class interests. The only problem is how to identify the elite 
and here Mill proposes a criterion of occupation as the most 
appropriate, though admittedly far from perfect, test. 
 J. S. Mill’s elitism is a rare species, since it is completely honest 
and well-meaning.  I do not think that by plural voting he was trying to 
bring back through the back door the domination of the rich. Moreover, 
he sincerely believed in the impartiality and far-sightedness of 
                                        
24 J. S. Mill, Pledges [2] in: CW - Vol. 23 - Newspaper Writings 1831-1834, p. 497. 
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intellectuals, though not to the extent that would convince him to give 
all the power into their hands. With that being said, his defense of 
plural voting is not only naive, but also rests on confused assumptions. 
It is one thing to argue that various minorities are entitled to 
proportional representation in parliament from the standpoint of 
equality, the “very root and foundation” [CW, XIX, p. 449] of democracy. 
It is quite another to claim that the most instructed know better and 
therefore their opinions on general interest should be given greater 
weight. One might be perfectly consistent in subscribing to any of these 
two propositions. But it is strikingly inconsistent to hold them both at the 
same time, even granted that the number of people with several votes 
would be very small. One of the deficiencies of Mill’s analysis is that he 
cannot quite make up his mind here. Torn between his democratic 
leanings and elitist tendencies his argument ends in a theoretical 
stalemate. 
 So J. S. Mill’s status as a wholehearted democrat is at least 
questionable. Obviously, there is no simple answer to the question 
phrased like: “Was Mill a democrat?”. A lot depends on what we 
understand by democracy. Clearly, Mill is not a democrat in a simple, 
majoritarian sense of the term.25 His defense of plural voting is as strong 
a testimony to this as anyone might expect. Obviously the term 
democracy is sometimes used in a quite different and broader sense. 
Then it signifies not a strictly political attitude but a belief in lack of any 
                                        
25 D. E. Miller, J. S. Mill..., ibid., p. 188. Compare also similar opinion of C. L. Ten: 
“He is certainly not a democrat if democrat is someone who believes that each 
person’s vote should have exactly the same value as everyone ele’s.” C. L. Ten, 
Democracy, Socialism, and the Working Class in: The Cambridge 
Companion..., ibid., p. 374. 
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qualitative differences between people. This is also certainly not Mill’s 
position. He firmly believed that most of the differences between people 
result from the impact of contingent factors connected to the 
environment (both ecological and social) we happen to inhabit. Yet, it 
does not mean that there are no qualitative differences. Some people are 
and always will be intellectually and morally superior to others, for Mill 
that was an undisputed fact, however great the potential for 
development of virtually everybody in the future might be. But it does 
not put him among the defenders of the class or caste elitism. 
Everybody can rise to the ranks of Millian elite if only he represents a 
sufficient level of excellence. In our world the very idea of natural 
superiority of some will inevitably seem to many as unacceptable and 
priggish. However, it is perhaps worth remembering that our world is 
not Mill’s world and he was far from being alone in holding such views 
at the time (just like the current enthusiasts of unrestricted egalitarianism 
are nowadays). 
 Nevertheless, someone who would like to save the democratic 
credentials of Mill is not perhaps in an entirely hopeless situation. First 
of all, there is a more minimalistic conception of democracy which 
identifies it with popular control over government. Mill certainly thought 
that under no circumstances the rulers should be allowed to avoid such 
control. He was also of the opinion that while not everybody is wise 
enough to directly participate in the making of the laws, everybody can 
at least tell whether he approves of the results of a given policy. This 
line of argument, perhaps a bit perplexingly in the light of what I have 
said so far, he shares with his utilitarian teachers. But this is not an end 
to the story. Alan Ryan remarked once that sir Karl Popper’s liberalism 
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makes him “(...) more a constitutionalist than a democrat”.26 With some 
risk I think that this judgment can be also extended to J. S. Mill. He is a 
constitutionalist in a sense of trying to safeguard individual liberties 
(within the limits of the law) against any interference, even if it is an 
interference from democratic majority. But constitutionalism thus 
understood can sit quite well with a certain kind of democratic regime. 
Obviously, this is not a conclusive argument, yet the one which receives 
quite a solid support from the study of recent history. To my mind what 
can be at the very least inferred from it is that so far the best, albeit 
imperfect, way to defend individual liberties has been to grant everyone 
a right to political participation.27 And conversely, if the participation in 
political life is supposed to be meaningful, this goal is perhaps best 
promoted under conditions of respecting individual liberties. 
Utility and Civilizing Democracy 
 I began this paper with setting myself two tasks. Firstly, to 
examine in what relation does J. S. Mill’s theory of representative 
government stand to the classical utilitarian account of it? Secondly, to 
elucidate what kind of democratic regime is he arguing for, if it is 
actually democratic at all? It is now high time I attempted to formulate 
some, however provisional, conclusions. In the classical utilitarian 
political theory there is no inherent value ascribed to democratic 
institutions, they are justified by the fact that they produce the most 
effective management of state affairs. This is achieved due to the 
                                        
26 A. Ryan, Popper..., ibid., p. 419. 
27 Ibid., p. 418-419. 
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popular control over government exercised via elections. “The People, 
what interest have they in being governed badly?” as Bentham famously 
summed up the whole rationale.28 J. S. Mill did not thoroughly refuted 
this argument. Indeed, he thought that representative democracy is the 
most effective mode of government once people are actually mature 
enough to sustain it. But according to him democracy has a primarily 
educational role, in a sense of elevating the minds and ennobling the 
feelings of citizens. And education thus conceived is intimately 
connected with participation and virtues of active citizenship. This gives 
Mill an additional argument for the goodness of democracy which was 
not available to elder utilitarians, as well as allows him to value it not in 
an exclusively instrumental way. The only question to be asked is 
whether this is still an utilitarian argument? We might sympathize with 
the intention of developing people’s character, but does this necessarily 
make them happier, especially if happiness is conceived in hedonistic 
fashion? J. S. Mill sometimes seems to suggest something like this. It 
might be argued that highly developed individuals are able to pursue 
more varied and refined pleasures. All the more so if we are willing to 
accept Mill’s famous distinction between higher and lower pleasures. But 
Mill remains at the very least uncertain whether the ultimate goal is 
happiness or self-development for its own sake. It might be that it is 
better to be an “unsatisfied Socrates” than a “satisfied fool”, but is it 
really so because Socrates is happier in the ordinary sense? Therefore I 
claim that it is impossible to square Mill’s high praise of educational 
aspects of democracy with classical utilitarianism because of the self-
                                        
28 Quoted after R. Harrison, Democracy, ibid., p. 103. 
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professed hedonism of the latter. However, it remains an open question 
whether such reconciliation cannot be achieved if utilitarianism is 
conceived in a non-hedonistic fashion? And this is certainly the case 
with majority of the contemporary varieties of this doctrine (in fact I am 
convinced that Mill can be legitimately seen as a forerunner of these). In 
them utility is typically used as a vessel term which is supposed to 
denote whatever satisfies the actual desires of individuals or desires 
they would have under certain ideal conditions. If so, the desire for 
self-government might be established as one of the important ingredients 
of utility and consequently the inherent value of democratic 
participation can be at least to some extent vindicated. Yet, this solution 
is certainly not free from the problems either. First of all it should be 
noted that it makes the value of democratic self-government consequent 
upon it being actually desired29 or being rationally desired. In either 
case, the typical relation between valuing something and desiring it 
seems to be inverted. Furthermore, even granted that democratic 
participation is conceived of as one of the ingredients of utility it is 
surely not the only one. Therefore any consistent consequentialist view 
must elaborate on the trade-offs between various, and sometimes 
competing, elements of utility. The fault of J. S. Mill’s account was 
precisely that he did not give enough attention to these considerations. 
And it seems to me that contemporary utilitarians either make the same 
mistake or give us rather strong reasons to think that democratic 
participation in the present political realities indeed should not be 
placed very high on the list of utilitarian priorities. The whole issue is 
                                        
29 It should be noted that this might not be empirically confirmed in the case of 
many individuals even in democratic societies. 
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far too complex to be tackled here and thus no definite answer can be 
given, yet it seems to me at the very least reasonable to doubt whether 
contemporary utilitarian theory can accommodate much of the insight 
which we owe to the political works of the younger Mill. 
 With regards to the question of “How democratic J. S. Mill is?” it 
is clear that his elitist tendencies decidedly place him at odds with the 
most popular contemporary understanding of democracy. That is not to 
say that his elitism clearly dominates over more egalitarian elements of 
his thought. In fact his praise of civic participation acts as an important 
check against the conclusions which might be easily drawn from the 
conviction that some minds are intellectually and morally superior to 
others. I doubt whether Mill can deal with this tension in a satisfying 
way within the framework of his argument. Nevertheless, it is precisely 
this tension which is one of the most interesting features of his thought. 
Mill believed in the need to check and “civilize” democracy. This view 
does not enjoy particular popularity nowadays, for to assume that 
democracy needs to be civilized implies that it has not yet happened. 
But popularity is not always the best criterion in philosophy. In one of 
the most adequate descriptions of Mill’s attitude towards democracy I 
am familiar with John Skorupski claimed that he was both more 
enthusiastic about the potential of democracy to make people better and 
more pessimistic about its capacity to influence their character in a 
pernicious way than a vast majority of us currently is.30 Whether it 
testifies more to Mill’s naiveté or to our cynicism is something I must 
leave to the readers to decide.  
                                        
30 J. Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today?, London 2006, p. 86.  
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Abstract 
 The matter of “cultural security” is an area often ignored by most 
analyses, concentrated instead on providing a broad explanation for 
the complex scheme of international security perceived in a broader 
systemic sense.  
This article discusses one of the key hypotheses presented by 
Feliks Koneczny – the creator of a very persuasive theory on the 
synthesis of civilizations and multiculturalism; which seems 
profoundly up to date, while addressing the most lively issues of the 
modern European Union. Based on particular cases taken from 
world history, the Polish scholar attempts to illustrate, that it is 
nearly impossible to make multiculturalism work properly. Such a 
thesis must be submitted to thorough criticism with regard to other 
notable analysts operating within the same paradigm, such as for 
example Oswald Spengler. This dissertation presents a rather 
sceptical point of view upon the aforementioned issue and attempts 
to avoid arriving at a predefined simplified conclusion. 
Keyword: Multiculturalism, Feliks Koneczny, Oswald 
Spengler, Historiosophy 
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Introduction 
The complex matter of security concerning a specific entity 
observed on a global scale, has traditionally been viewed as the domain 
of cryptic calculations based on the paradigm of hard power.  This 
rarely sparks serious opposition. It makes perfect sense to assess the 
level of security based on facts, numbers, statistics and diplomatic 
relations. This data seems to provide many sensible and by all means 
objective (or close) answers. It is not at all surprising that serious 
scholars prefer to prove their hypotheses by providing evidence that is 
as strictly “scientific” as possible, which may however turn out to be 
insufficient in order to obtain a coherent picture of reality. Without 
deeper and less „mathematical” insight one cannot expect to 
comprehend the full scheme of things. Sometimes the argument based 
on history, emotion or the subtle differences in the line of thought 
decides on how a group/nation/civilization will behave, weather it is 
vulnerable or not so, whether its values are susceptible to change 
and/or deterioration or whether they provide an example willingly 
followed abroad. The matter of “cultural security”, therefore seems like 
the perfect way to direct the reader’s attention to areas often ignored by 
the traditional approach. 
1. Multiculturalism in its present (modern) shape. 
The problem of European security does not look promising at all 
from the perspective adopted in this analysis. This could be illustrated 
by many internal problems derived from and associated with the 
doctrine of multiculturalism. It proved to be a failure, as opposed to for 
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example the success of the United States – the world’s largest melting 
pot. Germany and France not only failed to turn many of their 
immigrants into western Europeans but managed to transform moderate 
thinking groups and societies into radicals (this term obviously does not 
concern everyone but is used solely as an image meant to illustrate the 
nature of the process), who on a large scale feel nothing in common 
with the countries they were born in. It would seem useful to provide a 
certain explanation for this occurrence – one which does not in any way 
boast absolute certainty or mathematical proof. The sensitive area 
defining culture or civilization is based largely on subjective feeling, but 
primarily depends on the past. It is in the depths of history that one 
should attempt to find the answer to why European culture as we know 
it may, to a certain extent, be in the danger of disappearing. 
   It would be useful in this context to mention a scholar long 
forgotten by science. Not many are aware that most of Samuel 
Huntington’s views and theories were preceded by early 20-th century 
historiosophy. Amongst the myriad of minds concerned with this once 
popular area of study one may find such brilliant individuals as Karl 
Jaspers, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. One notable 
acquaintance of the latter was Felix Koneczny, author of “On The 
Plurality of Civilizations”, published in English with a preface by 
Toynbee1. The Polish historiosopher, being a severe opponent of an 
omnipotent state, was virtually banished from all bookshelves in times 
of communism, only to cautiously return many decades later (during the 
90's). To those who ever heard of him (which is a rarity also in Poland) 
                                        
1 Koneczny F. [1935] 2002. O wielości cywilizacyj [On the Plurality of 
Civilizations]. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk.  
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the scholar is known for creating a complex theory based not only on 
rational arguments and pure logic but also on persuasive examples from 
world history. His concepts, even though from a different age, provide a 
sensible explanation on why Europe’s cultural policy is failing today to 
such an enormous extent. They could prove helpful if one wishes to 
predict the shape that this continent will take as a possible effect of past 
mistakes. Before the above mentioned theory will be explained in 
regard to the issue of multiculturalism it seems necessary to provide 
some brief evidence on why it is currently believed by many that the 
West is so culturally vulnerable and why traditional European values 
seem to be under attack. 
 A wise place to begin would be by quoting the words of the 
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. She appears to be quite confident 
that the attempt to create a multicultural society in Germany, where 
people would “live side by side happily” has “utterly failed”. Most 
importantly the leader of CDU puts the majority of the blame for such a 
state of things on immigrants, noting that it is they who failed to 
integrate and lack initiative – not even wanting to learn the language of 
the country they inhabit2. According to some polls conducted in 2010 as 
much as 30% of the population believed that the “country was overrun 
by foreigners”3. Even the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is sceptical. The world 
renowned think tank, known primarily for its leftist and “progressive” 
                                        
2 M. Weaver. 2010. “Angela Merkel: Multiculturalism has “utterly failed””. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-
multiculturalism-failed. (January 18, 2014). 
3 O. Decker, M. Weissman, J. Kiess, E. Brahler. 2010. „Die Mitte in der Kreise: 
Rechtextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010“. http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/do/07504-20120321.pdf. (January 18, 2014). 
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views states that about one third of the German populace believes that 
new citizens came to the country only for social benefits4. The 16 
million immigrants appear to be viewed by both left and right as 
completely unassimilated and often unfriendly towards with the culture 
of the state they live in. In this context Angela Merkel's statement must 
be presented in more detail:  
 
“In the beginning of the 60's our government called the foreign workers 
to come to Germany and now they live in our country […] We kidded 
ourselves a while, we said: 'They won’t stay, someday they will be 
gone', but this isn't reality. […] The approach to build a multicultural 
society and to live side by side and to enjoy each other has failed, 
utterly failed5”.  
 
The Chancellor was followed sometime later by Horst Seehofer, the 
leader of CSU who simply remarked that “multiculti is dead” 6. The most 
                                        
4 For more vide: speeches from the conference on “European Approaches to 
Multiculturalism and Integration” organized by The Smith Institute and The 
Fredriech Ebert Stiftung, London Office.  
5 Vide for comments: D. Frum. 2010. “Germanys Merkel is Right- 
Multiculturalism Has Failed”. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-
18/opinion/frum.merkel.multicultural_1_germany-s-merkel-chancellor-merkel-
angela-merkel?_s=PM:OPINION. (January 18, 2014); J. Smee. 2010. “The World 
From Berlin: Merkel’s Rhetoric in integration Debate is Inexcusable”. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkel-s-
rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html. (January 18, 2014); 
for entire speech: A. Merkel, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKG76HF24_k. 
6 H. Seehofer. 2010. “Multikulti ist tot”. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/horst-seehofer-multikulti-ist-
tot/3563806.html. (January 18, 2014). 
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important, provocative and controversial voice in this debate was 
without a doubt that of Thilo Sarrazin. This figure, traditionally more 
associated with the left (member of the SPD) dedicated a whole book to 
proving a theory that Muslim immigration is a threat to the cultural 
identity and security of the Bundesrepublik. The former member of the 
German central bank wrote: “No immigrant group other than the 
Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and 
crime”7. Another interesting comment on the subject is that of Rene 
Cupercus, Senior Research fellow at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation a 
think tank of the Dutch Labour Party:  
 
“When and why has the former Marxist, anti-religious, secular left 
become so respectful to religion, to Islam in particular, which in its core 
values and practices is not easily compatible (to put it mildly) with the 
anti-authoritarian cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the time 
when the world view of the left-liberals originated? Why did the 
cosmopolitan anti-patriotic left aggressively taboo and deny the idea of a 
national identity for European majority cultures (‘England or Holland 
does not exist’), but at the same time defend aggressively identity 
politics and ‘multi-cultures’ for non-western minorities?” 
 
He goes on to say, that multiculturalism has produced the contrary 
effect to what was expected. Its fruits are no other then growing 
                                        
7 “Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has Failed”. 2010. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451. (January 18, 2014); For 
more on Thilo Sarrazin vide: 2010. Deutschland schafft sich ab [Germany Is 
Doing Away With Itself]. 
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xenophobia, populist resentment and alienation8. The ideology behind 
immigration in Europe portrayed something different then for example 
in the United States, where many different nationalities and cultures live 
as “one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all”. 
The European model proved to be less successful. “You do not have to 
integrate”, should be rather interpreted as: “we do not want you here 
forever (reflected directly in Merkel's words)”. The rest of the population 
was told that they are the majority among others. The point is that such 
a situation already occurred in history and did not work. Pre-war 
Poland was a typical multicultural state, even more so then modern day 
Germany, France, the Netherlands or Britain. All societies lived 
relatively peacefully together, but they did not even try to integrate. 
Feliks Koneczny attempted to explain this situation historiosophically – 
many of his observations and hypotheses may prove useful as an 
argument in this debate9.  
 Rainer Baubock from the European University Institute in Italy 
provided quite a formidable theoretical argument against the concept of 
multiculturalism. While according to international law every nation has 
the right of self-determination and all minorities should be allowed to 
protect their culture against a particular majority “through pursuing 
their own projects of nation building”; it is difficult to oversee the fact 
                                        
8 R. Cuperus. 2011. “Why the Left was Trapped Into Multiculturalism”. 
http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/06/why-was-the-left-trapped-into-
multiculturalism/. (January 18, 2014). 
9 For broader insight vide: Koneczny F. 2001. Państwo i prawo w Cywilizacji 
Łacińskiej. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk; Koneczny F. 1997. Prawa 
Dziejowe [On the Laws of History]. Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk; Koneczny 
F. [1935] 2002. O wielości cywilizacyj [On The Plurality of Civilizations]. 
Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk.   
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that this principle is virtually incompatible with the “basic Westphalian 
norm of territorial integrity of states”. There was an attempt to get 
around this obvious logical contradiction by defining “peoples” in a 
more narrow manner then “nations”10. This was a wonderful solution in 
theory, but requires very specific norms in order to be implemented in 
practice. Can norms solve such complexities as values that seem almost 
spiritual – those deriving from the concept of a nation, culture or 
civilization? Can a sheer formality put an end to a live entity that has 
been in existence for hundreds of years? Highly doubtful. It is 
impossible to regulate relations between cultures entirely, merely with 
the help of definitions and norms, simply because cultures are based on 
emotion, feeling and the soul to a much more significant extent then on 
written sheets of paper. If one wishes all people within a nation to live 
side by side in a state of peace, they simply must have more in common 
than just an identical system of law and bureaucracy. This was the 
American approach and Europe really should take example from that 
success story rather than attempt to write its own from scratch. The 
“multiculti” failure was foretold by scholars long before the 
contemporary implementation of the doctrine. It seems worthwhile to 
provide a short reminder of that criticism and divert the reader’s 
attention to the classical theory of the “synthesis of civilisations” and 
futility of “multiculturalism” presented by Feliks Koneczny. 
2. A historiosophical analysis of the concept of multiculturalism. 
                                        
10 R. Baubock. “What went wrong with liberal multiculturalism”. 
etn.sagepub.com/content/8/2/271.extract. p. 271-275 (January 18 2014). 
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It appears that not all types of multicultural entities and 
strategies should be perceived as identical. Some cultures bear more 
common traits than others and are thus prone to synthesis and/or the 
possibility of fruitful cooperation. Some of them are even members of 
the same civilization and creating a common ground between them 
resembles a natural process. American culture came into existence as 
the fruit of cooperation and common values shared by representatives 
of a myriad of nations – most of which were European. If another 
civilization would come into the picture the situation would become 
drastically different, simply because the primary reason for the birth of 
any social group is a single unifying purpose, without which the need 
for a mutually supportive society never comes into existence. And 
although some individuals fool themselves to think otherwise – not all 
groups of people think the same way and have identical needs, 
especially if they have lived apart for hundreds of years with little 
contact apart from an occasional war. The chances are that they will 
never get along very well nor will they even think according to the 
same pattern; even when an inquiry concerns the simplest of things. 
The primary characteristic for every social group is, therefore a 
common purpose – this purpose is not the fruit of a simplistic contract, it 
is the effect of a long process of historic and spiritual evolution. 
According to Oswald Spengler for example, the reason for the existence 
of a certain culture is not bound to the civilization itself; its purpose has 
to be an abstract ideal, simply because only something not yet in our 
possession provides the necessary motivation for movement, action and 
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the “feeling of longing”11. Thus, the matter of purpose determines that a 
group forms (is created) not only as the fruit of biology but also due to a 
sort of higher calling. The specificity of each purpose predetermines the 
fact that a certain society is in fact a separate civilization. This simple 
theory suggests that mixing various cultural entities and thus attempting 
to create a sort of synthesis will always result in utter failure. The 
obvious reason for this is that various purposes show different paths to 
different places (various goals). How can a single group function in 
harmony if it is concentrated on separate and maybe even contradictory 
elements; if it wants (expects) different things from life? Such coexistence 
means nothing more than chaos and often leads to the decline of a 
certain or of all cultures concerned. The only way to merge two 
separate civilizations is by creating an alternative, much like it was done 
in the USA. Feliks Koneczny states that various civilizations are in a state 
of endless rivalry and a victory in war does not necessarily mean real 
victory in the field of culture – Rome and Greece are perfect examples. 
The reason for conflict lies in the mutual incompatibility of purposes 
and a popular feeling of certainty that “our goal makes the most sense”. 
This never ending rivalry is caused by the fact that societies naturally 
come into contact, they interact, live together or next to each other. As 
an effect some of them may cease to exist – and it is rarely the “better” 
(more developed, sublime) group that survives. Complexity is not at all 
attractive according to this hypothesis12.  
                                        
11 Spengler O. [1959] 2001. Zmierzch Zachodu [Der Untergang Des Abendlandes]. 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR. p. 192-208. 
12  Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 237-260. 
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2.1 The issue of compatibility and synthesis of civilizations. 
 One of the most valuable elements of Koneczny’s theory is 
probably the matter of compatibility (współmierność) and synthesis. 
Both terms are worth explaining in more detail. The scholar directs the 
reader’s attention to cultures which at first glance seem to be almost 
analogous. When observed in more detail however, one may notice 
significant differences even amongst the closest (representing many 
features that are alike) and most similar civilizations. Even if genuinely 
subtle, in those differences lies the true character of any society. Rome 
and Greece are perfect illustrations of that thesis; the similarities 
between them without a doubt surpass any possible differences: their 
alphabets are fully phonetic; their religious systems were virtually 
identical etc. Interestingly enough, according to Koneczny both societies 
belong to entirely different civilizations. This is because the essence of 
every culture is based on “the common method of organizing a society”. 
In the case of Greece in times of Hellenism, ergo the period after 
Alexander the Great its society can be characterized as oriental or 
Eastern. It resembles the original Hellenic civilization to a limited extent. 
The Roman model is personalistic, centred on the individual and on the 
classical rule of law. The attempt at synthesis was based on a common 
intellectual base. Unfortunately the basic line of thought turned out to 
be incompatible (niewspółmierna), which is the main reason for the 
splitting of the empire into two separate cultural entities. Both 
civilizations were without a doubt inspired by a similar set of abstract 
ideals, which derived from common sets of beliefs: first the classical, 
then Christianity. These, however can be interpreted in very different 
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ways and thus lead to the formation of various forms of practice, 
preferred ways of acting, dogma and moral duty. Orthodox and Catholic 
Christianity do not differ significantly (much less then for example 
Protestantism and Catholicism) in terms of the declared set of beliefs, 
but the practice of faith is entirely different. The dominating rule which 
requires one to follow in the footsteps of The Lord stays the same but 
the ways of realizing that rule vary significantly. Both religions value 
humility. In the West the mentioned trait is altruistic, centered on the 
individual and understood as helping others, actively combating 
injustice and evil, changing the world etc. This is precisely why we had 
schools, hospitals, poorhouses, universities and such – all established 
and ran by the clergy. In the East the world is also understood as 
imperfect, but the religious element simply implies that one has to 
accept imperfection and contemplate fate as God’s will – similarly to 
Islam13. This is perfectly reflected in many works of art – for example 
architecture. Oswald Spengler sees the dome of an Orthodox Basilica as 
a sort of prelude or introduction to the quick spread of Islam in the 
former Eastern Roman Empire. The German historiosopher sees the 
Hagia Sophia as a perfect Mosque – built before the formal birth of 
Islam as a sort of prediction of the future. This example seems to 
illustrate how two almost identical societies – with common roots and 
similar beliefs can choose disjointing paths of development; the reason 
for which lies simply in the deep incompatibility of vision and purpose. 
A man of the West wished to experience objective beauty – paying 
special attention to both realism and symbolism in creating works of art. 
                                        
13 Ibidem. p. 237. 
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The Easterner sought perfection by deep introverted thought and 
meditation. According to Koneczny “various societies look upon good 
and evil, the idea of beauty, perfection, usefulness and uselessness in a 
completely different manner. They can have various points of view 
concerning the above elements, not to mention that even their vision 
(ideal) of truth (purpose) is never compatible or analogous. A certain 
goal is only analogous (mutually corresponding/correlating) within 
societies belonging to one civilization”14. Ergo, it is futile to expect the 
possibility of creating a synthesis of civilizations, since different cultures 
are by their very nature incompatible (they have different goals, 
dreams, ideals, interpretations of dogma etc.) Koneczny backs this thesis 
up by quoting one of the conclusions of an annual meeting held by The 
Ethnological Society of Religion in 1929: “one cannot imagine a crime 
that at some time or place could not have been interpreted as an 
honourable deed15.” This statement seems just as persuasive today as 
over 80 years ago. How can one hope to create a common society when 
the group concerned lacks a common system of ethics, morality; its 
elements (nations, peoples) act differently, represent various 
mythologies, traditions and abstract ideals? One could obviously create a 
system of do's and don’ts a priori- it would however certainly prove to 
be seriously impaired by the lack of a historical (realistic) foundation. 
Such artificial constructions rarely prove to provide sufficient value. 
How can one substitute years of experience and evolution by a baseless 
projection. It is certainly better to trust in the wisdom of past 
                                        
14 Ibidem. p. 238. 
15 Ibidem. p. 239. 
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generations then the meditations and projects of madmen with visions of 
transforming the true fabric of society.  
 Because faith is such an important element in creating a 
civilization there are attempts to, in a way, establish a common ground 
in this matter in order to bring the people of the world closer together. 
This tendency is evident for example in the form of ecumenism in 
Christianity, which is without a doubt a noble and romantic cause. Such 
sentimental ideals usually do not bear the expected fruits however. Is it 
worth losing the truth in the name of common and united error? It is 
better to be divided by truth then united in error. Only people that are 
religiously indifferent could think of an endeavour to synthesize beliefs 
in the name of abstract compatibility at all costs. If one perceives 
his/her own culture or civilization seriously and believes in its mission 
or purpose how can one simply sacrifice it on the altar of uniformity? 
What is the point of unity without passion and belief16?   
 Another important element worth mentioning is the fact that 
victory in the field of rivalry is rarely possessed by the most aggressive 
or warlike civilization. Cultural expansion derives from the strength of 
ideals, beliefs, abstract ideas, myths and traditions. Let us consider the 
initial expansion of Islam. Christians, at first, were not being converted 
by sword, but primarily in the form of economic discrimination. The 
mission of expansion takes place in the mind and soul, because 
civilization is based on emotion, feeling and the heart – it lays in the 
world of abstraction, which precedes physical matter. The heart is 
always closed to the material world, but that world is bound to reflect 
                                        
16 Ibidem. p. 240-260; Spengler O. Zmierzch... p. 25-60. 
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the dreams and ideals of the former17. Most prominent and long lasting 
civilizations are in fact, as Koneczny describes them, sacred/spiritual in 
nature. They are characterized not only by ideological thought or 
doctrine but primarily by certain traditional customs (actions) reflected 
for example in liturgy, celebrating holidays, not eating meat (or certain 
types of meat) etc. Every element of life is filled with duties and 
obligations deriving from a certain religious system. It would be 
virtually impossible to merge these rules in the case of, for example 
orthodox Judaism and Hinduism, whilst maintaining their true form, 
nature and world outlook. Attempting synthesis would in this case seem 
barbaric and ignorant, would surely never work and most certainly be 
an act of sacrificing what both societies view as truth in the name of 
unifying them in error18. 
 The Polish scholar presents numerous examples from history 
which are meant to prove that attempts at the synthesis of cultures 
belonging to different civilizations are determined to fail. The vision of 
uniting mankind by merging its beliefs and traditions is not a modern 
invention it has been around since ancient times. The most notable 
example, no doubt directed by noble intentions was that of Alexander 
the Great, who was certainly one of the first great synthesizers of 
societies. The Macedonian king urged his soldiers to marry Persian 
women of which he gave an example by entering the eternal union with 
an Iranian dancer. He made numerous analogies between the Greek and 
                                        
17 Ibidem. p. 405-417; About the relationship between spirit and matter vide: 
Plato. Fajdros i Uczta in: Dialogi [Plato, Dialogues]; About the hierarchy of 
matter vide: Arystoteles, Metafizyka [Aristotle, Metaphisics]. 
18 Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 240. 
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Persian gods and dreamed of creating a common ideology encompassing 
his whole reign which was to be based on his individual persona. 
Alexander the Great believed it impossible to Hellenize the enormous 
and diverse East, which was no doubt a wise predicament. The 
problem, however was that he did not wish to accept the fact that 
people are by nature diverse and apparently could not understand that 
the existence of various cultures and states is a treasure of mankind 
instead of its burden. The king of Macedonia dreamed of unification and 
uniformity, which in turn ended up deeply changing the nature of his 
own civilization forever. The utopian vision of a single empire collapsed 
with ruthless consequence, what is worse is that even the Greeks 
themselves never again united (until the 19th century) – at least not in 
accordance with their traditional values and historical outlook. This is 
also proof that power politics and military conquest is not a sufficient 
method of successfully spreading certain values and beliefs19. The effect 
of such endeavours is usually contrary to expectations. Greeks 
(especially the elite) became increasingly “Eastern” (“oriental” if one 
prefers) – no one in their right mind would call Cleopatra (a Greek 
noble of the Ptolemaic dynasty) as an individual resembling Pericles, 
Demosthenes, Aristotle or Plato to a more significant extent then the 
Pharaohs of the Old Kingdom. The same can be said about distant 
Bactria. The only Greek element one could observe there would 
probably be the external design of money (coins), which in some 
manner resembles the traditional Hellenic model.  
                                        
19 Ibidem. p. 250. 
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 A very notable example of the madness of artificial “self-
correction” carried out in order to look (seem) more friendly to a foreign 
culture could be perfectly portrayed by early Byzantine-Islamic 
relations. The empire wished to persuade the Muslims to convert to 
Christianity by incorporating some elements of their civilization. Images 
of God, the Saints and Angels- which were particularly revered by the 
Eastern Orthodox Church were banned and thus thousands of priceless 
works of art were barbarically destroyed. The fact that worshipping 
images is not allowed in Islam is in full accordance with the main 
principles of that religion. One can say that it is a fundamental logical 
outcome of the nature of that civilization. Allah is primarily 
characterized as all powerful and his will cannot be questioned or 
creatively reflected upon. The same cannot be said about Eastern 
Christianity, which is so strongly tied to the image as an important 
sacred element, that brings an individual closer to God – whose most 
important traits are centered on mercy and love. The Byzantine Greeks 
wished to solve the problem of an expanding Islam by cooperation, 
dialogue and compromise. They went ahead and decided to sacrifice 
one of the most important elements of their own world outlook only 
because they believed it would spark positive feeling towards them 
from their adversaries. The effect was contrary to their expectations: 
such an act can only be perceived as a display of weakness and 
decadence by young and dynamically expanding cultures. How can one 
motivate the destruction of something so dear? Could it be only because 
one does not have the will or strength to fight for what one believes in? 
Or perhaps that individual does not really believe in anything anymore? 
Every idealist thinks in the categories presented above and the only way 
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to gain his/her respect is to honourably fight (not necessarily in 
militaristic terms; by argument as well for example). An act that is 
hostile to something as dear as one’s own civilization seems to be 
nothing more than the proof of its decadence and spoilage. It is a sign of 
its oncoming end20. Thus it becomes almost obvious, that attempts at 
combining (by means of synthesis) entities as ancient and complex as 
civilizations does not reap the expected benefits. 
 In this context it would also be wise to mention a failed attempt 
of cultural synthesis, which concerns two protestant churches in 
Hohenzollern Prussia. Frederick I strove to centralize and unify the 
religious sphere which would give him the possibility to even further 
submit it to the dominance of the state. The theological dogma of 
Lutheran and Calvinist sects are fundamentally different. One cannot 
simply reconcile the two. This is precisely why they came into existence 
– Protestantism split into various groups for idealistic and philosophical 
reasons (The Anglican Church is probably the only exception), not 
practical ones. It is futile to hope to unite separate religious entities 
simply by administrative means. This depth of thought could not be 
achieved by the Prussian elites of that time (18th century). Their actions 
portrayed religion not as the foundation of civilization or culture but a 
means to an end – a sort of tool whose primary purpose was to further 
strengthen the formal institution of their state. In 1719, as an initiative of 
Frederick Wilhelm I, theologists from Tubingen put together 15 new 
articles of faith based on which both branches of Protestantism were 
supposed to be united. The king subsequently rejected the Calvinist idea 
                                        
20 Ibidem. p. 240. 
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of predestination and issued a directive for the newly unified church to 
stick to the Calvinist “Agenda” (means of administration). The only effect 
of this act was the growing indifference of the protestant religion 
towards matters of faith and could have been one of the many seeds of 
atheism and agnosticism in Europe. It would be useful to mention 
George Calixtus in this context. The 17th century theologian planned to 
create a synthesis of all protestant branches. This proved to be 
impossible and the fruit of his universalism was nothing more than a 
system of ethics without the proper motivation (roots). Thus one can 
observe that attempts at uniting cultures artificially usually lead to their 
significant decline21. 
 Civilizations differ in basically all forms of human existence. 
They even perceive science itself in a completely different manner. Both 
the scientific method and purpose of science vary drastically in the 
West and for example in China. According to Koneczny, in the former 
the main goal is learning the truth – no matter if mankind can reap its 
practical benefits. Within the latter culture one performs each action for 
the good of society, thus science has to be utilitarian and useful here 
and now22. It is difficult to leave this thesis without discussion. 
Practicality as the sole motive for invention is surely not a Chinese trait. 
Black powder, for example was put to religious/sacral use, it became an 
element of many festivities in honour of the emperor, which is no doubt 
a very abstract sphere. One can find many more examples of inventions 
that were meant to fulfill higher needs then just earthly and practical.  
                                        
21 Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 244-245. 
22 Ibidem. p. 246-248. 
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 The creation of new cultures by synthesis is a futile task also 
because it is nearly impossible to even understand the motivation of 
another civilization without extensive knowledge about it (and even then 
it is difficult). A good example would be an illustration of the primary 
differences between Hinduism and western Christianity. The first is 
based upon religious acts (customs) – not ethics are important here but 
rituals. Even if someone would undertake the endeavour of collecting 
the meanings of all of them, the system would prove to be inconsistent 
and illogical. Christianity is mostly about reflecting upon a theologically 
(scientifically) organized dogma. The rituals are mostly introverted and 
in comparison to Hinduism there are very few of them. In Hinduism 
every day is a unique holiday which demands certain rituals (for 
example on the island of Bali). Each day is a cause for celebration and 
brings with it a certain mythical story, which often does not even 
contain a point (moral).  The goal is to petrify certain ways of acting, 
gestures, mimicry and motivate life with tradition and myth. Hinduism 
brings one closer to the Deity with gestures. Christianity does the same 
with thought and ethics. It would seem wise to provide an example of 
Hindu myth as evidence of the hypotheses put foreward above. While 
observing a play on a temple altar in Bali one could not help but 
wonder about the lack of its moral or philosophical value. The legend 
concerned a prince who failed to hunt down an animal. While looking 
for the pray he noticed an empty coconut shell and urinated inside it. 
On the next day a simple girl went into the forest, noticed what the 
prince left behind and drank it. She got pregnant, carried the baby for a 
year and gave birth to a frog. A certain princes fell in love with this 
(male) frog, who in turn asked Shiva to turn it into a human being. The 
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deity replied that the frog is in fact a prince and fulfilled his bidding. 
They lived happily ever after. One cannot help but address a question 
to Mahatma Gandhi, who stated that the Western mind is entirely 
materialistic and the Hindu is idealistic, what ideals the above legend 
contains? To be brief – it is just a meaningless story, with no abstract 
value, its strength is locked in the fact that it exists and is believed to be 
true – which is direct proof that Hinduism feeds primarily on tradition: 
classic forms of sacrum. How can one possibly hope to unify two 
societies as different from each other as the West and Hinduism? They 
think differently, have various motivations, believe in different things 
and have entirely disjoint purposes for existence according to their ways 
of thinking. To even consider synthesis is thus without a doubt entirely a 
waste of time, for the only way in which it could be successful is by 
destroying both societies and building something else in their place. 
Such barbarism should no doubt be avoided23. 
It would be worthwhile to also mention the subject of time itself. 
This too is perceived in an entirely different manner by various 
societies. The Hindu look upon time in an emanative and cyclic way. 
The energy of Brahma endlessly emanates from the deity but with each 
minute it becomes more and more unclean – polluted by actions that do 
not derive from it directly. This is the source of all suffering and the 
reason that the world is imperfect. Every once in a while evil energy 
starts to dominate over the good and the world collapses in on itself. 
The deity then builds a new world, thus beginning a fresh cycle. Every 
individual is trapped inside this cycle – this is known as reincarnation. 
                                        
23 Own observations and Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 247. 
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He/she can break free however by entering the state of Moksha and 
thus become “nothing”. This theory implies that existence is 
participation in something that lacks perfection and each Hindu should 
live in a state of conflict towards his/her being as well as the material 
world24. The Latin civilization is based on creationism (not to be 
understood in its new meaning) a concept which leads one to believe 
that the world was created only once and does not undergo any 
significant change in terms of its nature and character. This formulated a 
bond of the individual and physical matter that he exists in, which in 
turn led to the evolution of modern empirical science25. 
When considering the concept of the synthesis of civilizations 
one cannot help but mention the Jewish people and their unique 
culture. Because of the complexities of history the Hebrew people can 
be found all over the world – always for the benefit of the place they 
inhabit. They do not wish to assimilate fully however and represent an 
elitist point of view upon their values and beliefs. They feel no 
particular need for spreading their outlook abroad either – it was meant 
solely for them. This is what makes the Jewish civilization strong and 
vital. No special longing for synthesis is typical for this culture – it is 
content with the respect it feels towards its ancestors and forefathers: 
“they stand on the shoulders of giants”, that is why they achieved so 
much. The belief in being the chosen people does not have to be 
abandoned just so other cultures feel better about themselves26. This is 
                                        
24 Own observations; Ibidem. p. 52- 51; Koneczny F. O wielości... p. 289- 294. 
25 Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 47-72. 
26 Ibidem. p. 249. 
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no doubt an attitude that provokes respect from people of worth that 
remember their own heritage. 
2.2 Multiculturalism and the theory of the crossroads. 
Felines Koneczny also directs the reader’s attention to the matter 
of multiculturalism and the theory of the crossroads. It is based on the 
predicament that cultures which exist at the crossroads of civilizations 
are predestined to be richer, more valuable culturally and stronger 
intellectually. He states that the lack of criticism in the many benefits 
flowing form that idea lead to the birth of “one of the most absurd 
myths of modernity”. Were it to make any sense, then Russia would 
prove to be the leader of the world. He meticulously identifies as many 
as seven cultures which can be found within the great country27. Even 
if, sometimes it would be easy to disagree with the details, the Eastern 
giant was always, without a doubt a truly multicultural nation. Instead of 
making that trait the primary example set for humanity it was the 
source of a significant energy drain. Russia put so much effort during its 
long history in order to suppress internal nationality driven conflicts 
(Poland, Georgia, Ukraine, The Caucasus as a whole etc.). Much of its 
actions were driven by attempts to maintain unity instead of 
concentrating on more vital problems. This may be one of the reasons 
why the country is still quite backward. Civilizations simply have 
different goals, purposes and ideals, they cannot be merged or 
reconciled nor can they be conquered by sheer force. It is simplistically 
understood expansionism that made Russia what it is today.  
                                        
27 Ibidem. p. 35-36. 
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Finally it should be made clear that the matter of synthesis of 
civilizations was based purely on an a priori method of analysis. It was 
a premeditated romantic and sentimental ideal of creating a universal 
society in which everyone could live together in harmony. Such 
concepts are usually utopian in nature. How can you expect harmony 
from two groups of people who have conflicting goals? It is a child’s 
wish that will probably never come true, for it is deemed impossible by 
philosophy and logic. Looking back at history one may easily notice that 
attempts at civilizational synthesis were always artificial and predestined 
to fail28.  A new civilization can come into existence as an effect of the 
emergence of a new purpose/ideal or it can undergo significant decline 
and be dominated by another culture. There is simply no alternative. 
Multiculturalism is a somewhat different concept then the one 
described in detail above, when the main goal of analysis is the full 
explanation of certain occurrences which make it difficult for a given 
culture to realize its purpose or the mission it believes it is a set to fulfil. 
Synthesis means sacrificing some elements and truths of a given cultural 
order (system) and incorporating others in their place so that a new 
entity based on common methods of thinking, feeling and existence 
could be created – this group may otherwise be called a civilization. 
Multiculturalism is simply about incorporating foreign elements of 
existence into an entity (society) which are unable to correspond with 
the given order of life29. These new methods of existence are unable to 
assist in achieving a certain cultures purpose if they were provoked into 
being by entirely different sentiments and beliefs. Incorporated elements 
                                        
28 Ibidem. p. 249. 
29 Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 260. 
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of a foreign origin can only disrupt a given culture from achieving a 
certain goal (or attempting to achieve it). They can tear the delicate 
fabric of a unique way of life, change the nature of a civilization and 
interrupt its sense of direction (movement, dynamism). The greatest risk 
of creating a multicultural environment artificially is that society will 
transform into an uncultured, chaotic mass without a certain unique 
purpose. Such a state would ensure its decline.  
Oswald Spengler for example describes civilization as a living 
organism. It is difficult to fully agree with such Neo-Darwinist 
statements but society is surely something more than just a mechanism 
or group of people who agreed upon a „social contract”. It is also not 
merely founded on pure instinct, which transforms the actions of a 
group based on changes of the outside environment in accordance with 
a certain system. The German scholar presents the opposition between 
what “is alive” (as opposed to “dead” mechanical creations) and what is 
not. He believes that live entities are defined by their spiritual element 
and thus cannot be understood as machines put into movement by 
matter. In this case the term organism does not contain its typical 
meaning. Spengler uses it as a metaphor; if society is an organism then 
it contains an element of escaping the curbs of science and the 
possibility of empirical description – it is more complicated than a 
regular mechanism. It does not react in a given, predefined manner 
towards external change; its actions, in a way, cannot be predicted; they 
seem almost metaphysical30. The metaphor of an organism was also 
used by scholasticism in the Middle Ages in order to describe purpose 
                                        
30 Spengler O. Zmierzch... p. 115-142. 
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in nature. This term is obviously very useful also when analysing the 
goal of every society, as long as it is understood purely as a metaphor31. 
The existence of a given entity has meaning only when it has a certain 
predefined goal that it strives to achieve; in other words it should act in 
accordance with the platonic „intention of existence”. Simply put: every 
element of a certain organism has to fulfil its purpose according to the 
goal of the whole. The head is responsible for leadership, the legs for 
walking etc. Their actions are brought into life automatically, simply 
because the mentioned body parts have been designed (by nature or 
God) to do so. The same could be said about a society, culture and 
civilization. It should be allowed to act based on instinct (which is the 
fruit of historical development), in accordance with its character and 
purpose. Its representatives should realize that when two legs move in 
an unsynchronized manner this may bring about the risk of tripping. 
Oswald Spenger is positive, however that each society is determined to 
grow and develop to a certain moment and is bound to deteriorate one 
day anyway. Every civilization must face decadence, nihilism and die of 
natural causes.32 Feliks Koneczny is sceptical towards such theories. His 
argument is based on the fact that many ancient civilizations still exist 
and did not disappear whilst some were short-lived and fell into a 
period of decadence and decline. Ergo, societies do not simply die of old 
age as people do but are able to carry their traditions with them almost 
endlessly – unless of course they lose their sense of purpose and 
meaning – this in effect leads them to a state of adaptation: they either 
                                        
31 St. Thomas Aquinas [1265?] 2006. O Królowaniu... [De Regno...].Kraków: 
Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej. p. 43-61. 
32 Spengler O. Zmierzch... p. 205-224. 
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yield to another civilization or fall into a state of deep depression and 
cease to exist33. According to Koneczny the primary reason for the fall of 
a society is the loss of its unique goals – this happens most often as an 
effect of multiculturalism, where a variety of unfamiliar ways of 
understanding reality are introduced. It is impossible to believe and/or 
acknowledge two contradicting truths/ points of view/ purposes of life 
etc. When the representatives of a society begin to do so it just stops 
being a society and becomes a group of different people united by one 
law and government – nothing more. This is also predetermined to be 
temporary. Every culture understands the concept of law differently; 
every civilization has different sets of rules based on various historical 
and/or religious traditions/predicaments rooted in thousands of years of 
practice. It is naive and sentimental to believe that many cultures can 
happily live in a “modern”, “liberal” state – this is possible only in the 
case of its inventors; no one else will understand it nor truly 
acknowledge its purpose. 
When certain elements of a given organism are motivated by 
disjointed sets of hopes, purposes and truths, then the whole entity is 
unable to achieve the originally intended goal. When a society 
completely loses its predefined traits and thus the purpose for its 
existence it becomes pointless to even analyse it. 
 A civilization can lose its unique direction as an effect of the 
simplest events, which by themselves should not under any 
circumstance, be subject to criticism. In neighbouring societies cultural 
contact between them as well as mutual impact are inevitable and 
                                        
33 Ibidem. p. 115-142. 
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profound. Some “foreign cultural elements” are not a danger to the 
civilizational fabric of a society at all – inventions, simple customs and 
technical details can exist in full correlation with its purpose and goal34. 
The adaptation of external elements has to, however be in full 
accordance with the „law of proportion”. Feliks Koneczny notices (at the 
beginning of the 20th century) that occurrences typical for frontiers and 
border areas can now be found virtually everywhere. “We can now 
observe that two members of the same family can now belong to two 
different civilizations, even ones hostile to each other. This is evidence 
of a growing instability of beliefs, views – even terms and ideas, as well 
as the growing uncertainty of purpose and the meaning of existence of 
individuals35”. Not so long ago we could witness the disappearance of 
ancient and noble families of the past. Each owed its allegiance to one 
stable and continuous meaning for ages, which could be decrypted for 
example from their medieval coats of arms. They were loyal to the 
traditions of their ancestors. One could expect a certain predefined way 
of thinking and analysis from a given noble family for decades, even 
though they married representatives of the aristocracy from many 
different nations (but usually within one civilization). Today, the respect 
for tradition and duty has virtually disappeared and one can observe 
that individual views are no longer shaped by the family. 
It looks as though Feliks Koneczny attempts to blame the decline 
of Western Civilization on different cultures. This is no doubt a serious 
mistake. Dadaism, turpism, surrealism, futurism etc. were not the fruits 
of foreign thought. The relativist point of view is uniquely Western, no 
                                        
34 Ibidem. p. 260.  
35 Ibidem. p. 260. 
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one else thought of it but us. Every civilization has a profound feeling of 
righteousness – it is absolutely sure that the direction which it chose 
over the centuries is the right one. There are certain implications based 
on which one may call a society a civilization. They are inspired by a 
belief in a certain purpose and meaning. The West seems to have lost 
its sense of direction. Instead of reflecting upon the matter of 
multiculturalism and the synthesis of cultures one should rather create a 
new category:  anticivilization. This entity did not evolve as an effect of 
an energy drain caused by the influx of foreign cultures as Koneczny 
would like but as the fruit of The French Revolution. It is without a 
doubt that attempts at synthesis or creating a multinational state may 
have an effect on the feeling of purpose of a given society, but living 
next to someone of a strong sense of identity can also serve as an 
inspiration to revive our own sets of values. In practice a more diverse 
society can lead to stronger feelings of civilizational patriotism and self-
definition. It often happens that a given culture can incorporate foreign 
elements and thus enrich its heritage. In the case of Hinduism for 
example there is no doubt that without its special characteristic, based 
on the ability to provide a unique way of understanding others and 
giving meaning to cultural values stemming from the outside, it would 
not last for such a long time. If not for the fact that each foreign truth 
could not be meticulously and quite accurately (with broad 
understanding) added to the system, that system would probably 
decompose. Its tolerance should not be understood in the modern 
meaning of the word, ergo; everyone has their own truth and we should 
respect that because we do not really know what truth is. The Hindu 
civilization says rather – every truth is in accordance with our truth; if it 
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is not, then we will make it so. Instead of attacking it tries to prove the 
futility of the classic form of conflict. It fights rather in the intellectual 
and mystic spheres. This special kind of tolerance makes the mentioned 
culture very resilient and powerful; it takes what it can, enriching its 
heritage without in any way destroying its foundations – everything is 
modified in accordance with its main set of beliefs. However, one 
should mention the fact that Hinduism never could really incorporate or 
tame Islam. The conclusion can be twofold therefore: the “law of 
history”, as Felix Koneczny calls it, concerning the futility of 
multiculturalism and the synthesis of civilizations is not entirely 
accurate. Sometimes multiculturalism provides the best results for a 
given culture, but it is very often the other way around as well. 
Historiosophy does not really give a certain answer, but provides a 
broader spectrum which enables an individual to really understand the 
meaning of such words as tolerance, diversity and multiculturalism; 
instead of just repeating them aimlessly as an element of fashionable 
modern propaganda36. 
3. Conclusion 
There are numerous examples in history which prove that 
multiculturalism as well as its other form based on the synthesis of 
civilizations are ideals that are incredibly difficult to achieve in practice. 
If a given society really wishes to put them to life its elites should feel 
obliged and compelled to rely not only on empty words and goodwill 
but also on historical evidence and experience stemming from the past.  
                                        
36 Ibidem. p. 118-124; Koneczny F. Prawa... p. 261. 
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It is possible for different cultures to live together happily, whilst 
enriching their heritage, but in order to do that all of these cultures 
have to believe in a certain form of truth. If one of these societies is 
decadent and increasingly nihilist it is bound to be spiritually conquered 
by others. This is a conclusion, which cannot be ignored when 
attempting to bring such ideas to life – for with noble ideals it is always 
profoundly difficult to do so. 
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Abstract1 
Development of the think tank sector in post-communist states is, at 
times, regarded as a self-evident consequence of the processes of 
democratization. However, the specific “environment of obstacles 
and opportunities” makes it neither automatic, nor easy for think 
tanks of the region to join the policy game. In particular, it is not 
clear to what extent the think tanks in transition democracies can or 
should engage in strictly political disputes. The alleged shift from 
academic towards advocacy profiles that is said to characterize 
Western think tanks evokes numerous questions in post-communist 
settings. 
The paper provides an analysis of the development of the think 
tank sector in Poland and the challenges it faces on its way towards 
"maturity". It aims at getting some insights into perspectives of think 
tanks themselves. Building on a qualitative analysis of think tanks’ 
mission statements, survey data and interviews with think tank 
managers, it analyses how they construct their positions of policy 
experts at the crossroads between politics, science, business and the 
media. 
Keywords: think tanks, policy analysis, boundary work, expertise 
                                        
1 Paper prepared for presentation at the IPSA XXII World Congress, ‘Reshaping 
power, shifting boundaries’, Madrid 8‐12 July 2012 
  
 
 
 Polish Journal of Political Science. Working Papers 
 
96 
 
Introduction 
The processes of democratic transformation in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) have made it clearer than ever that, as Hugo Heclo 
explains,  
Politics find its sources not only in power but also in 
uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do. 
[…] Governments not only ‘power’ (or whatever the 
verb form of that approach might be); they also puzzle. 
Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on 
society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing.2  
The necessity of knowing in order to decide – particularly in the context 
of transformation – makes it inevitable for “the world of politics” to seek 
expert advice. Even if modern experts do not rule, as the followers of 
the technocratic model of knowledge-politics relations would have it, 
they definitively have a say. According to Sheila Jasanoff,  
Experts have become indispensable to the politics of 
nations, and indeed to transnational and global politics. 
Experts manage the ignorance and uncertainty that are 
endemic conditions of contemporary life and pose 
                                        
2 Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to 
Income Maintenance (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn, 1974), 305. 
Cited after Richard Freeman, "Learning in Public Policy," in The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Policy, ed. Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. 
Goodin (2006: Oxford University Press), 372.  
  
 
 
major challenges to the managerial pretentions and 
political legitimacy of democratically accountable 
governments. Faced with ever-changing arrays of 
issues and questions – based on shifting facts, untested 
technologies, incomplete understandings of social 
behavior and unforeseen environmental externalities – 
governments need the backing of experts to assure 
citizens that they are acting responsibly, in good faith, 
and with adequate knowledge and foresight. The 
weight of political legitimation rests therefore 
increasingly on the shoulders of experts, and yet they 
occupy at best a shadowy place in the evolving 
discourse of democratic theory.3 
 
This “shadowy” position of experts may have to do with the fact that 
experts are not (or perhaps: no more) easy to classify along the 
knowledge-politics divide. The paradox is that expertise, which at times 
is expected to make politics less “political” (that is: more rational, 
evidence-based) is not as “apolitical” (that is: free of values or ideology) 
as it may seem.4 It would be hard to deny that knowledge has become 
                                        
3 Sheila Jasanoff, "Judgement under Siege. The Three-Body Problem of Expert 
Legitimacy," in Democratization of Expertize? Exploring Novel Forms of 
Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making, ed. Sabine Maasen and Peter 
Weingart (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 221. 
4 See: Michael Schudson, "The Trouble with Experts - and Why Democracies 
Need Them," Theory and Society 35, no. 5-6 (2006); Stephen P. Turner, 
"Political Epistemology, Experts and the Aggregation of Knowledge," 
Spontaneous Generations 1, no. 1 (2007). 
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more pluralistic than ever – the public fights of experts and counter-
experts, the cacophony of expert opinions, and the questioning of 
unquestionable facts are proof of this development. 
In Robert Hoppe’s adversarial model of knowledge-politics relations, 
political expertise serves as ammunition. In this perspective, “[p]olitics is 
the non-violent power struggle between political parties and/or 
organized interest groups that, through processes of partisan mutual 
adjustment, leads to temporary compromises on the public interest”. 
According to the model, “every interest involved will look for the type 
of scientific expertise that harnesses and legitimizes its pre-formed 
political stance”. In the adversarial model, experts seem to be “guns for 
hire” and are ready to offer access to facts that suit the needs of their 
patrons, which is quite a disturbing picture. However, Hoppe remarks 
optimistically that “both empirically and normatively one may argue that 
scientific arguments as political ammunition improve the quality of 
political debate, at least if everybody has equal access to scientific 
expertise. To the extent that political controversies mobilize scientific 
expertise, they even contribute to knowledge use”. The idea of “equal 
access” to knowledge is however easier to declare than to implement – 
“access to knowledge and expertise has itself become a source of 
conflict, as various groups realize its growing implications for political 
choice.”5  
                                        
5 Robert Hoppe, "Rethinking the Science-Policy Nexus: From Knowledge Utilization 
and Science Technology Studies to Types of Boundary Arrangements," Poiesis 
Prax 3(2005): 210. 
  
 
 
Experts may also become active players on the political stage, playing 
not only on somebody else’s, but also on their own behalf. According to 
David Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, they may adopt one of three 
attitudes: that of an objective technician, that of a client’s advocate, or 
that of an issue advocate.6 This “engaged” side of expertise is well 
reflected in the dynamic development of think tanks (especially these 
with advocacy profiles). While referring to the ideals of scientific 
neutrality and objectivity, they lay out some interest-bound objectives. 
Think tanks are a modern way of combining “the apolitical” with “the 
political” for the sake of policy.  
The period of transformation has given rise to the dynamic development 
of the think tank sector across most post-communist countries.7 
Although think tanks have been operating on the expert scenes of CEE 
countries already for over 20 years, there is still more than just a grain 
of truth in Krastev’s diagnosis that “[i]n post-communist societies, a think 
tank is something everybody hears about but nobody actually knows 
much about”.8  
The gap in research on think tanks leaves much space for various 
investigations. The principal aim of the present paper is to characterize 
Polish think tanks in terms of legal, geographical, financial and personal 
factors. Building on this foundation, we would also like to introduce 
some concerns about organizational identities of think tanks in Poland, 
                                        
6 David Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice 
(New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005). 
7 According to a directory published by Freedom House (1997), soon after the 
transition over 100 of these institutions appeared in the CEE area.  
8 Ivan Krastev, "Post-Communist Think Tanks. Making and Faking Influence," in 
Banking on Knowledge: The Genesis of the Global Development Network, 
ed. Diane Stone (London: Routledge, 2000), 142. 
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and also assess the ways they try to find balance between “the political” 
and “the scientific”.  
The procedure of obtaining data we would further refer to has involved 
creating a database of over ninety Polish think tanks (on the base of 
information provided by mass media, international comparative studies, 
think tank and NGO’s directories, analyses of expert networks etc.).  
Three analytical components involved qualitative analysis of mission 
statements of Polish think tanks published on their web sites, an Internet 
survey (with quantitative and qualitative elements) conducted in Spring 
2011,9 as well as semi-structured interviews with 12 think tank 
representatives (conducted in March and April 2011).  
Defining think tanks 
 It is quite difficult to draw the lines of demarcation around the 
concept of a think tank, as these organizations “vary considerably in 
size, resources, areas of expertise and in the quality and quantity of the 
publications they produce”.10 For this reason it is not easy to give an 
example of a “typical think tank”,11 as “attempts to universally define the 
term think tank in a concise way are bound to fail due to substantial 
                                        
9 The survey contained 23 questions. The answers from 27 institutions (out of over 
80 which received invitations) have been obtained.  
10 Donald E. Abelson and Christine M. Carberry, "Following Suit or Falling Behind? 
A Comparative Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States," 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 31, no. 3 (1998): 259. 
11 Donald E Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public 
Policy Institutes (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 8. 
  
 
 
differences between scientific, technocratic and partisan varieties.”12
  
Because of the history of the think tank phenomenon, the Anglo-
American model of think tanks as “policy research organizations that are 
independent of government and universities” and “operate on a not-for-
profit basis”13 usually serves as a kind of role model. As explained by 
Krastev, “it is the American environment of policymaking marked by 
fragmentation and the separation of executive and legislative power, the 
American distrust for federal bureaucracy, the weak American party 
system, the American philanthropic tradition, and finally, the American 
tax regime which made policy research institutes ... into autonomous 
and influential players. Anglo-Saxon culture, founded upon the power of 
rational argument, is the proper context for understanding the power of 
twentieth-century independent policy research institutes in America and 
Britain”.14 At the same time, the development of think tanks across the 
globe makes it clear that think tanks can, and do, operate under 
alternative conditions. According to Stone, “there are a host of legal, 
political and economic reasons peculiar to the history and institutional 
                                        
12 Dieter Plehwe and Bernhard Walpen, "Between Network and Complex 
Organization: The Making of Neoliberal Knowledge and Hegemony " in 
Neoliberal Hegemony. A Global Critique, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard 
Walpen, and Gisela Neunhöffer, Routledge/Ripe Studies in Global Political 
Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). 
13 See James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, "Think Tanks and Civil Societies in 
a Time of Change," in Think Tanks & Civil Societies. Catalysts for Ideas 
and Action, ed. James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2000), 4. 
14 Ivan Krastev, "The Liberal Estate. Reflections on the Politics of Think Tanks in 
Central and Eastern Europe," in Think Tanks and Civil Societies. Catalysts 
for Ideas and Action, ed. James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver (New 
Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 274-75. 
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make-up of a nation as to why there is no one best model or trajectory 
for think tank development” and “[t]he notion that a think tank requires 
independence from the state in order to be 'free-thinking' is an Anglo-
American norm that does not translate well into other political 
cultures”.15 Consequently, according to the so called “middle course 
definition” proposed by McGann and Weaver, think tanks can be 
characterized not by independence, but rather by “significant autonomy 
from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest 
groups, and political parties”.16  
 For the purpose of our account of Polish public policy institutes, 
we propose to adopt a definition coined by Martin Thunert, who 
describes think tanks as “non-profit public and private organizations 
devoted to examining and analyzing policy-relevant issues and 
producing research outputs in terms of publications, reports, lectures 
and workshops, in most cases targeted to identifiable audiences with the 
hope of influencing decision-making and public opinion”.17  
Theoretical concerns (at the margin) 
                                        
15 Diane Stone, "Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition," in 
Asian Development Bank Institute Symposium: “How to Strengthen Policy-
Oriented Research and Training in Viet Nam” (Hanoi 2005), 3. 
16 McGann and Weaver, "Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of Change," 5. 
17Martin Thunert, "Think Tanks in Germany," in Think Tanks Traditions: Policy 
Research and the Politics of Ideas., ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham 
(2004), 71. Although most think tanks in Poland operate as non-governmental 
institutions, there are some important analytical institutes with ties to 
government (such as Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych or Ośrodek 
Studiów Wschodnich) or universities (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW), 
which perhaps should not be excluded from the think tank category by virtue 
of the very functions they perform.  
  
 
 
On a side note to the main track of the present article, let us briefly 
remark that it is always useful to refer to a broader context of expertise, 
as well as to the knowledge-politics relation, while analyzing think tanks. 
Experts are namely a kind of “inbetweeners”, who code and decode 
different forms of knowledge. They make use of two different language 
codes. The “downward code” is “limited by the low competences of 
lower circles in the field of formalized interpretation of the world”. The 
“upward code” is limited by “experts” strong dependency on vivid and 
imprecise popular language”.18 Expertise does not equal scientific 
knowledge. It can instead be understood as knowledge transmitted in 
advisory processes. It is usually issue-oriented and aims to solve 
particular problems. Although it is usually scientists who become 
experts, their role in advisory settings is associated with various 
difficulties. As remarked by Sheila Jasanoff, “the questions contemporary 
policy makers ask of science are rarely of a kind that can be answered 
by scientists from within the parameters of their home disciplines”.19 
The issues that are interesting for politicians are not defined by 
scientists. Rather, they are the result of the complex and urgent nature 
of social problems.20 They are “trans-scientific” – although they are 
questions about facts and can be answered in the language of science, 
science cannot actually give any answers, as they transcend it.21 Thus 
                                        
18 Joanna Kurczewska, Technokraci I Ich Świat Społeczny (Warszawa 
Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 1997), 252. 
19 Jasanoff, "Judgement under Siege. The Three-Body Problem of Expert 
Legitimacy," 211. 
20 Steven Yearley, Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study 
of Science (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2005), 161. 
21 Alwin M. Weinberg, "Science and Trans-Science," Minerva 10, no. 2 (1972): 
209.After: Yearley, Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study 
of Science, 162. 
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think tanks are mediating institutions able to cope with trans-scientific 
questions.  
In our analysis of think tanks, we refer to the theoretical framework of 
boundary work, which allows us to capture the think tanks’ dynamic 
position between the spheres of science and politics (but, also between 
the media and business). The concept of boundary work was developed 
by Thomas P. Gieryn, who analyzed the discursive construction of 
boundaries around science. Gieryn’s “cultural cartography” addresses 
the issue of dynamism in defining (or  mapping out) epistemic 
authority, reliable methods and credible facts.22 Being convinced that 
there are no fixed or given criteria of what is science and what is not,23 
24 Gieryn was trying to track the processes of drawing boundaries and 
constructing authority of science by its practitioners.25 He underlined 
that, considering some form of activity, science results in several 
practical consequences, such as gains in financial resources, prestige 
and legitimacy. For this reason, scientists are eager to take up activities 
                                        
22 Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the 
Line (Chicago; London: Chicago University Press, 1999), 4. According to Gieryn, 
people having different beliefs constitute different „maps of science”. Each map 
justifies why science should be considered something special. See Nicola J. 
Marks, "Opening up Spaces for Reflexivity? Scientists’ Discourses About Stem 
Cell Research and Public Engagement," (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 
2008). 
23 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1965), 34. 
24Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1973).Rdz.13 
25 Marks, "Opening up Spaces for Reflexivity? Scientists’ Discourses About Stem 
Cell Research and Public Engagement," 42. 
  
 
 
aimed at enlarging material or symbolic resources, as well as securing 
their professional autonomy.26 
 
 
According to Gieryn, 
“Boundary-work" describes an ideological style found in 
scientists' attempts to create a public image for science 
by contrasting it favorably to non-scientific intellectual 
or technical activities. Alternative sets of characteristics 
available for ideological attribution to science reflect 
ambivalences or strains within the institution: science 
can be made to look empirical or theoretical, pure or 
applied. However, selection of one or another 
description depends on which characteristics best 
achieve the demarcation in a way that justifies scientists' 
claims to authority or resources. Thus, "science" is no 
single thing: its boundaries are drawn and redrawn 
inflexible, historically changing and sometimes 
ambiguous ways.27 
 
Gieryn’s work has inspired many authors. Whereas his focus was on the 
ways science is differentiated from other spheres, that is to say, on 
                                        
26 Thomas F. Gieryn, "Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from 
Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists," 
American Sociological Review 48, no. 6 (1983): 782. 
27 Ibid.: 781. 
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boundary conflicts, authors such as Robert Hoppe and David H. Guston 
pay more attention to the mechanisms of cooperation (in spite of and 
because of differences), and to boundary organizations that occupy the 
space “between” the spheres with clearly demarcated boundaries.  
According to Hoppe, boundaries can be drawn in two complementary 
ways: by demarcation (which is aimed “to protect it from unwanted 
participants and interference, while trying to ascribe proper ways of 
behaviour for participants and non-participants”28) and coordination 
(which “defines proper ways of interaction between these practices and 
makes such an interaction possible and conceivable”29). Demarcation 
and coordination are “two sides of the same coin”.30 
Guston31 enriches the boundary work concept with the idea of 
“boundary organizations”. As he explains, “first, they provide the 
opportunity and sometimes the incentives for the creation and use of 
boundary objects and standardized packages; second, they involve the 
participation of actors from both sides of the boundary, as well as 
professionals who serve a mediating role; third, they exist at the frontier 
                                        
28 Séverine Van Bommel, "Understanding Experts and Expertise in Different 
Governance Contexts. The Case of Nature Conservation in the Drentsche Aa 
Area in the Netherlands,"  (PhD-thesis, Wageningen University, 2008), 35. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Robert Hoppe, "From ‘Knowledge Use’ Towards ‘Boundary Work’. Sketch of an 
Emerging New Agenda for Inquiry into Science-Policy Interaction," in 
Knowledge Democracy: Consequences for Science, Politics, and Media, ed. 
Roeland J. in 't Veld (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 10. 
31 David H. Guston, Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity 
and Productivity of Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
———, "Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An 
Introduction," Science, Technology, & Human Values 26, no. 4 (2001). 
  
 
 
of the two relatively different social worlds of politics and science, but 
they have distinct lines of accountability to each32”33. 34.  
The concept of “boundary organization” provides interesting insights for 
the study of expertise, because it underlines the double dependence of 
experts (and expert organizations) on their principles. According to 
Guston, the boundary organization must reconcile stability with the 
demands of its principals in order to succeed .35 Such a type of 
organization “draws its stability not from isolating itself from external 
political authority but precisely by being accountable and responsive to 
opposing, external authorities. Boundary organizations may use co-
optation, the incorporation of representatives of external groups into 
their decision-making structure, as a bridging strategy […], but they 
                                        
32 Guston, "Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An 
Introduction," 400, 01. 
33 ———, Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and 
Productivity of Research, 400, 01. 
34 According to Hoppe, “In the quest for best practice, for simplicity’s sake, five 
conditions or attributes for boundary arrangements can be listed (…): - Double 
participation („people from both the policy/politics and the scientific world are 
represented and participate in the activities of the boundary organisation or 
arrangement”); Dual accountability („The leadership or management of 
boundary organisations and arrangements is accountable to representatives of 
science and politics, simultaneously”), Boundary objects („The creation and 
maintenance of a well-chosen set of boundary objects in generating a ‘world’ in 
which both scientists and policymakers feel at home and may successfully 
coordinate their activities”), Co-production („robust knowledge/power 
structures create social and cognitive order using negotiation, confrontation and 
mediation”), Metagovernance and capacity building („This is the cross-
jurisdictional, cross-level and cross-scale orchestration of distributed knowledge 
production). Hoppe, "From ‘Knowledge Use’ Towards ‘Boundary Work’. Sketch 
of an Emerging New Agenda for Inquiry into Science-Policy Interaction," 22, 23. 
35 Guston, "Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An 
Introduction," 401. 
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attempt to balance it precisely between scientific and political 
principal”.36  
Although the above-mentioned theoretical concerns are not central to 
the present account of think tanks and research findings we want to 
present at this point, they are certainly useful and can provide much 
inspiration and guidance in analyzing think tanks within a broader 
framework of knowledge-politics interface.  
Development of think tanks in Poland 
Keeping theoretical concerns in mind, let us now turn to the task of 
sketching a picture of the think tank sector in Poland, in terms of its 
historical development and current shape.   
 In the late 1980s, think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe 
began to develop dynamically. However, some research institutes that 
could be considered think tanks (in the broader sense of the term) had 
existed long before the beginning of the process of transformation. 
Already in the interwar period in Poland, the scope of policy research 
was quite broad.37 
 After World War II, policy analysis in all the communist 
countries of the CEE was monopolized by the government and the 
respective dominant ideology, although there were several levels of 
                                        
36 Ibid.: 402, 03. 
37 Among others, there were a few renowned institutes that specialized in matters 
concerning Eastern Europe, such as The Scientific Research Institute of Eastern 
Europe (Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Europy Wschodniej) (1930-1939), or 
Eastern Institute (Instytut Wschodni) (1926-1939); See Marek Kornat, Polska 
Szkoła Sowietologiczna 1930-1939 (Kraków: Arcana, 2003). 
  
 
 
freedom in the “knowledge industry” at that time. According to Krastev 
(2000), it consisted of Academia ("Heaven": maximum intellectual 
freedom), the Ministerial World ("Hell": neither intellectual freedom 
nor political influence) and institutions affiliated to the Nomenclature 
("Paradise": guaranteed political influence, but not intellectual freedom). 
Policy research was usually conducted either at the government-
controlled academies of sciences or at ministry-affiliated research 
institutes. Some of these units have stood the test of time and operate 
successfully to this day (for example The Western Institute, Instytut 
Zachodni). 
 Among numerous problems that plagued expertise under 
communism, the lack of broader agora for discussing alternative 
proposals with the wider public was a very important factor. Ideas were 
thus debated in more or less informal discussion circles, which 
influenced the climate of opinion among some groups of intellectuals, 
such as The Club of the Crooked Circle (Klub Krzywego Koła) or 
Experience and Future (Doświadczenie i przyszłość), although both their 
independence and influence are disputable.38 
 When the Solidarity movement broke out, the intellectual 
ferment gained visibility. Numerous experts engaged in advisory 
activities for the Union and – for a short time – ideas circulated within 
enthusiastic segments of Polish society. For example, the so-called 
Center for Social and Professional Works (Ośrodek Prac Społeczno-
Zawodowych) served as an advisory and consulting body of the Union. 
Its tasks included conducting research, preparing analysis and 
                                        
38 Andrzej Friszke, "Początki Klubu Krzywego Koła," in Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris: 
Instytut Literacki, 2004). 
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prognoses. It produced recommendations on economic and social 
matters relevant to the leadership of the Union, as well as educational 
materials and drafts of documents or programs.39 “The carnival of 
Solidarity” was followed by repression under martial law. However, 
these ideas persisted and intellectuals from the opposition went on with 
their conceptual work, paving the way for future reforms. Some of the 
expert circles that “grew out at the heart of the solidarity movement” 
went on to become institutionalized as the first independent think tanks 
in Poland. 
 An important advisory structure was formed on 18th December 
1988 by 135 intellectuals and activists invited by Lech Wałęsa to the 
The Solidarity Citizens' Committee (Komitet Obywatelski 
"Solidarność"), originally named "Citizens' Committee with Lech Wałęsa" 
(Komitet Obywatelski przy Lechu Wałęsie). Issues covered by 15 
specialized commissions that operated within the structure included: 
unions' pluralism (Tadeusz Mazowiecki), political reforms (Bronisław 
Geremek), law and justice (Adam Strzembosz), health (Zofia 
Kuratowska), science and education (Henryk Samsonowicz), culture and 
social communication (Andrzej Wajda), local government (Jerzy 
Regulski), and associations and social organizations (Klemens 
Szaniawski). The Committee formed an intellectual base for the 
“Solidarność” during the Round Table talks and parliamentary elections 
of 1989. Despite internal conflicts that marked the late period of its 
                                        
39 Grzegorz Majchrzak, "Ośrodek Prac Społeczno-Zawodowych," in Encyklopedia 
Solidarności, ed. Adam Borowski, et al. (2010). 
  
 
 
activities, its role as a repository and generator of ideas for the emerging 
ruling elites was crucial.40 
The process of transformation opened the window of opportunity 
for alternative expert knowledge. Policy research institutions in Poland 
have entered the public scene as players aspiring both to play and to 
shape the game at the same time. In fact, they have kept this ambition 
until today.  
Basic characteristics of think tanks in Poland  
What does the think tank sector in Poland look like today? In 
light of my estimation, based upon the analysis of references from 
directories, books, articles, TV and the internet, as well as the databases 
of Polish NGOs and scientific institutes, there are over 80 active 
institutions that, as one can argue, can be labeled as think tanks.41 To 
sketch their institutional profile, we will consider the legal, financial and 
personal factors, as well as the fields of specialization and activities they 
take up.  
Legal status 
 There is no distinctive legal mold for think tanks in Poland. In 
fact, as allowed by the broader definition, their legal forms are quite 
diversified (See: Chart 2).  
 
                                        
40 Jaroław Szarek, "Komitet Obywatelski Przy Przewodniczącym Nszz „S” Lechu 
Wałęsie," in Encyklopedia Solidarności, ed. Adam Borowski, et al. (2010). 
41 According to Ziętara (and in line with James McGanns’ think tank rankings), 
there are about 40 think tanks in Poland. Ziętara forecasts that their number 
should reach the level of about 60 in the next couple of years and thus 
stabilize. 
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Chart 2: The legal status of think tanks in Poland  
 
Source: own research 
 
85% of think tanks belong to the third sector: 61% as foundations (with 
such recognizable institutes as Adam Smith Center, CASE, The Gdańsk 
Institute for Market Economics, Institute of Public Affairs), and 24% as 
associations (including the Center for Political Thought, Global 
Development Research Group or the Institute of Geopolitics). The 
general legal framework for such activities is provided by the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In the 12th Article, it ensures 
“freedom for the creation and functioning of trade unions, socio-
occupational organizations of farmers, societies, citizens' movements, 
  
 
 
other voluntary associations and foundations”.42 More specific 
regulations are provided by The Act of April 6th 1984 The Law of 
Foundations, and The Act of April 4th 1989 The Law of Associations. 
However, to decide which of these associations and foundations can 
indeed be considered think tanks is neither easy nor indisputable.  
Another group of think tanks, about 7%, operates within academic 
structures, as more or less autonomous entities. Examples include 
Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych of the Uniwersity of Warsaw (2010), 
Centrum Badań nad Terroryzmem Collegium Civitas (2005), and 
Centrum Badawcze Transformacji, Integracji i Globalizacji TIGER at 
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego.  
About 6% of the institutions belong to the public sector. These 
organizations are set up by separate legal regulations and are subjected 
to various governmental bodies. Most notable examples include the 
Polish Institute of International Affairs (Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych, operating under the Act of 20 December 199643 and 
a statue44). PISM is a state organizational unit with legal personality. The 
Center of Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnic), which used to 
be a state budgetary unit created by the act of the Minister of Economic 
                                        
42 http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htmTHE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF 2nd APRIL, 1997 As published in 
Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, item 483 
43 "Ustawa Z Dnia 20 Grudnia 1996 R. O Polskim Instytucie Spraw 
Międzynarodowych.,"  in Dz.U. 1996 nr 156 poz. 777  (1996). 
44 Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów Z Dnia 5 Października 2009 R. 
W Sprawie Nadania Statutu Polskiemu Instytutowi Spraw 
Międzynarodowych. 
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Cooperation with Abroad of 31 December 1990,45 has been reorganized 
under the Act of 15 July 2011 and turned into a state legal body 
subjected to the Prime Minister.46 
At the moment, there is just one party think tank in Poland, the Civic 
Institute (Instytut Obywatelski) – the expert division of the ruling party 
Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) (although several other parties 
declare (and used to declare in the past) their will or first attempts to 
create similar institutes). In 2010, the Civic Platform submitted a bill to 
the Parliament, which provided for the creation of political foundations. 
For the time being, political parties may spend up to 15% of budgetary 
subventions on their expert fund (The Act of 27 June 1997 The Law on 
Political Parties). However, as there is no obligation behind this 
possibility, a lot of money is invested in TV advertisements or 
billboards. According to the bill, parties would have to create 
foundations and spend 25% of subventions on expert works and 
seminars. Possibilities for self-promotion would be seriously limited. 
Although the majority of political parties declared their support for the 
idea of extending expert activities of the parties, the project has not 
been accepted by the Parliament, notably due to limiting party 
subventions as such. Nevertheless, discussions concerning the 
                                        
45 Zarządzenie Nr 15 Ministra Współpracy Gospodarczej Z Zagranicą Z 
Dnia 31 Grudnia 1990 R. W Sprawie Powołania Ośrodka Studiów 
Wschodnich.  
46 Ustawa Z 15 Lipca 2011 R. O Ośrodku Studiów Wschodnich Im. Marka 
Karpia. See Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów Z Dnia 12 
Października 2011 R. W Sprawie Nadania Statutu Ośrodkowi Studiów 
Wschodnich Im. Marka Karpia. 
  
 
 
possibilities of introducing the system of party foundations have been 
restarted in the Sejm of the 7th cadence.47 
Geography of expertise 
The geographical distribution of think tanks in Poland is characterized 
by the prevalent dominance of Warsaw. 69% of organizations are 
located in the capital. There are also 8% in Kraków, and 4% both in 
Wrocław and  Łódź. The concentration of analytical institutes around 
decision and media centers is a relatively general tendency. Although 
information technologies seem to reduce distance, they cannot change 
the fact that it is important “to be at hand” when new hot issues emerge 
unexpectedly. In addition, in the age of information overload, decision 
makers particularly value direct contact with experts.48 The argument 
for developing regional think tanks results from the fact that many 
decisions that affect citizens to the largest extent are in fact taken at a 
local, municipal level. Moreover, creating expertise at some distance 
from capital cities sometimes allows for the consideration of alternative 
perspectives and the analysis of various subjects from different angles.49  
Financing 
Another aspect that substantially influences the everyday of the think 
tank sector is its financial structure. The financial standing of think tanks 
in Poland is still taking form. For a long time, Western donors provided 
                                        
47 Marta Tumidalska, "Po Wraca Do Projektu O Przekazywaniu Części 
Subwencji Na Think-Tanki," Polska Agencja Prasowa 2012.  
 
48 See Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, "Doradztwo W Zakresie Polityki Zagranicznej 
W Rfn," in Doradztwo w polityce zagranicznej RFN - inspiracje dla Polski, 
ed. Anna Łabuszewska and Katarzyna Kazimierska (Warszawa: Ośrodek 
Studiów Wschodnich, 2008). 
49 As underlined by one of the interviewed experts. 
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new policy research institutes with a substantial part of the necessary 
funds.50 Foreign funding included that from private foundations (such as 
OSI, Olin Foundation, Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and Ford 
Foundation), foreign government agencies or entrepreneurial funds (for 
example USAID, British Know-How Fund), public foundations (K. 
Adenauer Stiftung, F. Ebert Stiftung, etc.), international organizations (e.g. 
World Bank, IMF, OECD), and EU funds (structural funds, framework 
programs for research and development)51. With gradual consolidation 
of democracy in the region, some of the original sources of financial 
assistance “started moving eastwards”52 and the EU's share of the 
funding of think tanks has thus increased remarkably. 
 Polish research institutions share financial problems that are typical for 
many think tanks across the world. They operate on a project basis and 
they usually have to search for funding to cover their core 
organizational costs. According to Schneider, “If they have limited funds 
their personnel (researchers) have to be affiliated to either academic 
institution (university, faculty, academy of sciences) or for-profit 
institution (consultancy, financial companies). Alternative arrangement 
means minimal staff with volunteers running a network of certified 
experts or limited staff on fundraising, project management, public 
                                        
50 Erik C. Johnson, "Central Europe’s Think Tanks: A Voice for Reform," Ideas into 
Action. Think tanks and Democracy. 3(1996): 10. 
51 Jiří Schneider, "Think-Tanks in Visegrad Countries. (from Policy Research to 
Advocacy)," (Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University 
2002), 13. 
52 Juliette Ebélé and Stephen Boucher, "Think Tanks in Central Europe. From the 
Soviet Legacy to the European Acquis," in Think Tanks in Central Europe 
and Eurasia: A Selective Directory. Third Edition (Budapest: Freedomhouse, 
2006), 18. 
  
 
 
relations and information technology (web page) while researchers are 
hired on specific projects.”53 
 The need for patching up institutional budgets can (and often 
does) result in unsatisfactory financial transparency. Many think tanks 
still do not publish any information on their budget and donors. At the 
same time, it is increasingly suggested that think tanks' policies should 
not be considered in isolation from the broader framework of donor-
recipient relations54, especially with respect to foreign policy.  
Although much investigation is needed to assess the sizes and structures 
of think tanks' budgets in Poland, our survey allows us to make a few 
working observations. First of all, the budgets differ in terms of size (for 
example for 2010 they ranged from 700 PLN to 8 435 000 PLN; only one 
organization had a budget near to the average of approximately 192 000 
PLN). In comparison, the average budget of a NGO in Poland was 
20 000 PLN, as it was for 2009.55 Most financial resources reach think 
tanks through projects contracted by public administration and 
international organizations. The average volume of public resources 
equals 37%, although, if one excludes institutions financed solely from 
the public budget, it decreases to 12%.  
                                        
53 Schneider, "Think-Tanks in Visegrad Countries. (from Policy Research to 
Advocacy)," 14. 
54  See Zdzisław Krasnodębski, "Po Koronacji Obamy," Rzeczpospolita, 27.01. 2009; 
Jan Filip Staniłko, "Między Cynizmem a Wartościami," Rzeczpospolita, 24.04. 
2010; Jacek Kloczkowski, "Czasy Grubej Przesady," Rzeczpospolita, 01.08.2007 
2007. 
55 Jan Herbst and Jadwiga Przewłocka, "Podstawowe Fakty O Organizacjach 
Pozarządowych. Raport Z Badania 2008," (Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie 
Klon/Jawor, 2011), 64. 
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Insufficient diversification of financial resources, a subject often tackled 
in literature, is not a major problem for Polish think tanks. Most 
organizations have at least three alternative sources of financing their 
activities. The lack of stability seems to be much more important. Most 
think tanks do not have any financial reserves, which could enable them 
to operate independently of outside donations, and also to be self-
sufficient when the flow of capital is blocked.56 
This constant quest for money results in paradoxes. As remarked by 
Krastev, “[s]ome of the most respected East European think tanks exist 
because of their donors, on behalf of their donors, and for the sake of 
their donors ... They are inventive in producing proposals, ingenious in 
producing accounting reports, and professionals in not producing 
trouble.”57 Financial dependency, especially if some of the interests of 
potential donors are to be addressed in the research, may “turn think 
tanks into cheerleaders.”58 It is indisputably a challenge to reconcile the 
high level of intellectual production with a time-consuming fight for 
financing. 
 
Human resources 
 The task of recruiting experts has posed a considerable 
challenge for the emerging market of think tanks in virtually all CEE 
                                        
56 Piotr Zbieranek, Polski Model Organizacji Typu Think Tank (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2011). 
57 Krastev, "The Liberal Estate. Reflections on the Politics of Think Tanks in Central 
and Eastern Europe," 274. 
58 Tomasz Teluk, "Jak Bruksela Kupuje Intelektualistów," Najwyższy Czas, 13. 03. 
2010. 
  
 
 
countries. Reflecting on the first generation of think tankers in post-
communist countries, Johnson cites three main sources of experts: 
poorly paid researchers from various disciplines who “sought to escape 
the often stagnant and inflexible academic environment, driven by the 
hope of playing a more active role in shaping the new institutions and 
policies of post-communist Central Europe”; members of opposition 
groups; and “frustrated – or sometimes replaced – officials from 
government.”59  It may be added that, in some cases, the backgrounds of 
some of the Polish think tankers combined all of the aforementioned 
characteristics.  
 The craft of "think tankery" was something to be mastered 
gradually. Initially, “university-educated researchers in the region often 
lacked practical training in policy relevant research and analysis [...] 
They tended to produce lengthy research reports, directed at identifying 
trends, rather than short, policy-oriented and problem-solving papers.”60 
Problems in form overlapped with deeper structural problems of a 
Polish social science still recovering from the torpor of communism. 
Additionally, the scarcity of financial resources has affected employment 
policy amongst think tanks and, as a consequence, the output of many 
institutes: “[r]elying on unpaid expert or unskilled volunteer staff, for 
example, may have impact on the quality of policy research and advice, 
but it may also indicate the ability to attract a broad community that is 
interested in and agrees with the work think tanks undertake or the 
ideals they promote.”61 
                                        
59 Johnson, "Central Europe’s Think Tanks: A Voice for Reform," 10. 
60 Ebélé and Boucher, "Think Tanks in Central Europe. From the Soviet Legacy to 
the European Acquis," 18. 
61 Roland Kovats, "Think Tanks: A Cornerstone of Democracy,"  (2000), 7. 
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Today, think tanks maintain relatively large network of specialists who 
occasionally participate in concrete projects. In terms of the average 
values obtained in our survey, one may observe that the base of experts 
who cooperate with Polish think tanks exceeds 11 (in case of permanent 
cooperation), and 36 (when occasional cooperation is included). The 
number who have full-time jobs at think tanks is much lower, as think 
tanks in Poland hire on average 13 experts and 3 administrative 
employees.62  
There are several factors that explain the dominance of these ad hoc 
forms of cooperation with experts. Primarily, there are some limitations 
of the spatial and financial nature. It is not possible to maintain a huge 
staff of experts in think tank offices (if they even have offices). In 
addition, working on a contract basis is in line with global trends 
observed on the labor market. Due to high labor costs, many employers 
avoid employing their staff in established posts. However, there is also 
one notable, think tank specific factor: to a large extent, their 
organizational brands rest upon the reputations of the experts they 
cooperate with. The expert pools of many think tanks include renowned 
professors, businessmen, (ex)politicians etc. People with such positions 
do agree to join program councils and to provide analyses from time to 
                                        
62 There are big discrepancies behind these average values: 8 institution do not 
hire an employees, 9 hire less than 10 employees, 4 between 10 and 20 and 4 
employ over 50 experts. In James McGann’s research institutions hired between 
6 and 1100 experts. See:  James G. McGann, ed. Think Tanks and Policy 
Advice in the Us Academics, Advisors and Advocates (Routledge,2007), 23. 
Similarly, in case of administrative staff, the values vary considerably: 10 
organizations have no administrative employees, 14 between 1 and 10 and two 
biggest have 15 administrative workers.   
  
 
 
time. Yet, they usually treat think tanks not as a main field of their 
activities, but as a sort of add-on (except for those situations when the 
revolving door phenomenon occurs and think tanks serve as an 
emergency exit after losing another post). At the same time, being a 
think tank employee is very attractive for younger analysts who are still 
working for their reputation. 
Think tank experts in Poland have varying backgrounds. They usually 
have experience in science, but also in the third sector, public 
administration and business. The least common backgrounds include the 
national parliament and the media.  
What criteria are considered to be the most important for taking up 
cooperation with experts? Answers given in the surveys have shown 
that a certain mixture of “scientific” and “practical” experiences is most 
desired (although, as explained by one of the interviewed experts, “it is 
hard to answer such questions directly, because we conduct over 50 
projects a year and different projects require different qualifications”). 
The elements of this mixture include specific knowledge in a given field, 
scientific qualifications, practical experience in a given field, and 
publications. Among criteria labeled as the least important there are 
political beliefs, experience gained in parliament and local 
administration (governmental administration is slightly more valued). 
Additional criteria, suggested by one think tank, consisted of “capacities 
of analytical thinking and finding access to information”.  
Placing political beliefs right at the bottom of the list of criteria 
considered in the process of recruiting experts provokes questions about 
translation of such declarations into reality. If think tanks wish to 
influence politics, then the political and ideological orientations of 
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experts may play an important role. At this point, it is important to 
differentiate between the political orientation of a think tank as an 
organization, and the political beliefs of individual experts who operate 
under its aegis.  The first aspect will be discussed later – we are going 
to ask if, and to what extent, and to which extent can we talk about 
clear cut ideological and political profiles of Polish think tanks. As far as 
the second aspect is concerned, nobody officially asks experts about 
their political preferences. Many institutions declare in their codes of 
ethics or guidelines that all politically colored (at times generally all) 
statements are made by experts on their own, rather than on the think 
tank’s behalf.63 Some think tanks declare that they exclude experts from 
certain activities the moment they start performing some functions in the 
public administration or government. However, such preventive steps 
do not change a simple fact that experts do not exist in a political 
vacuum. Similar beliefs may attract each other beyond official channels 
and, over the course of time, take the form of epistemic communities.  
The backgrounds of think tank experts, as well as the most important 
criteria of initiating cooperation with experts, show quite clearly that 
experts gain their symbolic capital outside the proper field of expertise. 
One may argue that only securing a high status in a different field (such 
as science, or public administration) makes it possible to speak 
authoritatively from expert positions. Another important characteristic of 
think tank experts, which was underlined both in the think tank’s 
mission statements and in the interviews, can be labeled as “pro-
activeness”. It has to do with taking the initiative to search for important 
                                        
63 For example see http://case.indigo.pl/strona--ID-o_case_kodeks,nlang-710.html  
  
 
 
research subjects, attracting the attention of potential publics and the 
media.64  
Fields of specialization and activities 
Another characteristic that seems to be important for drawing a fuller 
picture of Polish think tanks concerns the fields of specializations of 
these organizations. Most popular areas include foreign, economic and 
social policies (See Chart 2). 
Chart 2: Most popular fields of specialization of Polish think 
tanks 
European integration 65,4% 
Civic society 57,7% 
Foreign policy 53,8% 
International relations 53,8% 
Civic participation 50,0% 
Economic policy 50,0% 
Economics  46,2% 
Social policy 42,3% 
Source: own research 
 
The least popular thematic fields include pathologies of social life and 
the natural environment (which is quite surprising when we think about 
how important ecological issues are in public debates and policies). The 
fact that legal and human rights issues are uncommon is also surprising. 
Few organizations take up “non-up-to-date” subjects, such as history and 
political philosophy.    
                                        
64 For example see www.inspro.org.pl  
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Most institutes operating on the Polish market of ideas have a broad or 
a very broad spectrum of interests. Just a few organizations specialize in 
narrow fields. Symptomatic is also a dose of flexibility and willingness to 
deal with new subjects that politicians, the media and donors are 
particularly interested in. This last group particularly influences the 
thematic profiles of think tanks (as admitted by several experts during 
the interviews). Another remarkable tendency is to take up innovative 
subjects. Think tanks willingly present themselves as pioneers who 
discover and popularize niche, but important subjects that otherwise 
would skip the attention of the media, politics and science.   
A further feature of our characteristics is about the activities taken up 
by Polish think tanks. The spectrum is once again broad. Over 90% of 
organizations declare that they organize conferences, seminars and other 
events – both open to the general public, and behind closed doors by 
invitation only. Over 60% of organizations conduct their own research 
and publish academic research; almost 50% conduct practice-oriented 
research, and 56% propose solutions to practical problems. Interestingly, 
commenting on current events in the media has the same value. These 
results are interesting in the sense that they contrast with a rather 
popular image, according to which, conducting and popularizing 
research, combined with inventing policy solutions, is a key activity and 
sort of a trade mark of think tanks. In this sense, they confirm Diane 
Stone’s remarks about the limited correspondence between the myths 
and reality.65 
                                        
65 Diane Stone, "Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths 
Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes," Public Administration 85, no. 2 (2007). 
  
 
 
In the light of our findings, an “average” (or rather “averaged”) think 
tank in Poland belongs to the third sector, its foundation has a legal 
status and its headquarters is in Warsaw. Its annual budget is 
approximately 192 000 PLN. It hires over a dozen experts and a few 
members of the administrative staff, although its network of ad hoc 
collaborators is much broader. Its main field of analysis includes 
international relations, and organizing conferences seems to be the most 
common form of popularizing its findings.  However, if one looks 
beyond statistics, it becomes clearer that the microcosm of think tanks is 
certainly extremely diverse and – in spite of a few sharks – there is 
plenty of “expert plankton” which tries to fight for its own survival.  
Balancing for identity 
The basic picture of the Polish think tank sector presented above 
can be a good foundation for asking further questions – there are 
certainly many that can and should be asked. In the following section, 
we would like to address the issue of “political identity” of think tanks in 
Poland. Our study shows that unlike many other countries with 
established think tank traditions, where organizations with clear 
ideological and political profiles occupy most of the expert scene, the 
majority of the think tanks in Poland choose to rely on the image of 
“neutrality”. In the following paragraphs, we are going to ask how think 
tanks shape and view their own activity “between the world of politics 
and independent analysis” and will try to interpret their strategies within 
the framework of the concept of boundary work.  
Think tanks can be conceptualized as boundary organizations 
that draw from different cultural repertoires in order to gain recognition 
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in the public sphere and to realize their organizational goals. Basic 
points of reference for think tanks are provided by science and politics. 
Both on their websites and in the answers to our survey, Polish think 
tanks have declared that their most important values are scientific 
integrity, research independence, objectivism and the ability to be 
apolitical. On the other hand, they have been promoting certain political 
beliefs and representing social groups. It is quite surprising that the 
ambition to influence politics has been classified as quite low ,66 
                                        
66 The attempt to deepen the issue of influence in the interviews has shown that 
Polish think tanks – as some interviewed experts put it – “have aspirations but 
not illusions”, “are aware of their limitations” and “are not driven by ambition 
of exercising influence but by an intellectual passion”. Some think tanks try to 
influence legislative and decision processes (for example via preparing and 
assessing bills, monitoring), however most agree that “cooperation with the 
public administration is difficult”. Although think tanks in Poland have made 
important achievements in the field of policy, in the course of the interviews 
they usually mention just that politicians build on their ideas or cite their 
formulations (often without referring to the source) from time to time. Most 
interviewed experts associated influence with being present in the media 
(“more visibility=better promotion”).  In case of important and topical subjects, 
“the interest may be big” and “there is a chance of influencing the shape of 
public debate”. At the same time, “it is difficult to initiate a broader discussion”. 
It is much easier to start a debate among experts. “Improving content-related 
level of discussion also seems to be achievable”. Zbieranek reaches similar 
conclusions: “The sector is trying to influence the public opinion in the first 
line, in the second particular bodies of opinion – scientists, politicians and civil 
servants. These groups, or, in other words, social actors think tanks concentrate 
their activities on, create the multidimensional nature of their influence. Firstly, 
through the sphere of the media the sector shapes the public opinion. Secondly, 
it tries to reach scientists and create together the scientific and intellectual 
climate. Finally, it is interested in group that participate in shaping public 
policies, that is politicians and civil servants”. Zbieranek, Polski Model 
Organizacji Typu Think Tank, 169, 71. 
  
 
 
although it is often regarded as symptomatic of think tanks.67 Political 
influence is a complex category that allows for different interpretations. 
With regard to think tanks, Stone differentiates their three aspects – 
politically-bureaucratic, social and organizational.68 
While “bridging” science and politics (in fact, this is one of the 
most popular images in the mythology of think tanks69), think tanks need 
to look for their own identity. To a large extent, science is a reference 
point for them. If we analyze the way they do it in terms of boundary 
work, we may observe that the mechanisms of coordination (dominating 
in the survey answers), co-exist with a clear demarcation (that also 
dominates in the interviews).  
Ideals (that is: integrity, research independence, as well as being 
objective and apolitical) and organizational goals (providing the public 
debate with data, information and knowledge) of Polish think tanks, as 
well as and most valued experiences and characteristics of their experts, 
can be considered to be a clear reference to the language and cultural 
repertoire of science.70  
Demarcation can be observed at two levels. First of all, 
interviewed experts underline that think tanks offer a “different” kind of 
knowledge – expertise that touches upon burning issues, recommends 
solutions and is implementable. Its language is said to be accessible not 
                                        
67 Donald E. Abelson, A Capitol Idea. Think Tanks & U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Montreal, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), xv, xvi.  
68 See Stone, "Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition," 16.  
69 See ———, "Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths 
Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes." 
70 Por. Thomas Medvetz, "Think Tanks as an Emergent Field," (New York: 
Social Science Research Council, 2008). 
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only to peer-experts, but also to politicians, journalists and the general 
(though interested) public. Think tanks exceed disciplinary boundaries, 
cherish all forms of interdisciplinary and are flexible about 
methodologies and sources they consult.71    
The second aspect of demarcation contrasts the ideal of scientific 
disinterestedness and neutrality with the think tanks’ engagement and 
commitment to (at times political or ideological) values they want to 
pursue. Of course, there are different kinds of think tanks: advocacy and 
academic modes vary with respect to the degree of engagement. The 
literature on think tanks informs us of a tendency towards ideologization 
of think tanks’ activities. More advocacy tanks have been created during 
the last few decades.72 However, think tanks in Poland – at least in their 
official presentations - stick to the academic model and heavily draw 
from the cultural repertoire of science. Only a few organizations openly 
declare that they represent some ideological or political position. The 
survey confirms this observation. Only a few think tanks declared 
themselves to be “liberal” or “social democratic”, or talked about ideas 
that inspire their activities (at the same time stipulating that they do not 
influence research outcomes). Most organizations claimed to be 
“neutral”, “independent”, “apolitical”, or not to have any political or 
ideological orientation at all.  
                                        
71 Such an image seems to fit much of the mode 2 model of knowledge. See Helga 
Nowotny, Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons, "‘Mode 2’ Revisited: The New 
Production of Knowledge," Minerva  41(2003). 
72 See R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," PS: Political 
Science and Politics 22, no. 2 (1989). 
  
 
 
Another perspective has been revealed in the interviews when 
experts said that “ideological identification is important” and that “there 
is no contradiction between vision and knowledge”. It has also been 
confirmed that think tanks often gather experts with similar convictions 
(although the channels of selection are rather informal) and form an 
intellectual base of some political circles. In addition, several experts 
suggested that “neutrality” and “independence” (declared so important in 
the mission statements and survey answers) is in fact just a “façade” (of 
course only in the case of others). On the one hand, interviewed experts 
underline that “it is possible to declare one’s beliefs in a think tank”, 
which is “a healthy situation for the audience”. On the other hand, it is 
“good to hang out banners, but not to wave with them too excessively”. 
Generally (to use the words of some interviewed experts), Polish think 
tanks often “pretend that there is no politics”, “experts screen 
themselves off from politics and just a few make a creative use of the 
fact of operating in the political reality”, which can be described as a 
“childhood illness of being apolitical”.  
Such diagnosis inspires questions about possible reasons behind 
it. One can argue that the “neutral” attitude of most Polish think tanks 
reflects the ambition to create an image of institutions that are reliable 
due to their intellectual independence. Referring to American think 
tanks, Andrew Rich considered credibility to be the main capital of these 
organizations. According to Rich, in the USA, financial independence 
plays the most important role. Even think tanks with clear ideological or 
political profiles try to prove their independence from interest groups or 
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from the state.73 In Poland, the efforts to gain the image of an 
independent and credible organization do not concentrate on the sphere 
of budgets, but instead on political affiliations.  
Independence in regards to think tanks is indeed complex and 
contextual. Stone and Ulrich differentiate among its several aspects: legal 
(independence from state institutions), financial (manifested in 
diversification of financing sources), and scientific (the freedom to 
choose research subjects and to conduct research honestly).74 Magued 
Osman and Nesreen El Molla understand independence as “the right of 
institution to function according to its own normative and organizational 
principles without external interference”. They argue that “[f]or a think 
tank, this refers to the degree of self-regulation with respect to matters 
such as methods of conducting research, recruitment of policy for staff, 
internal workflow and the management of resources; whether generated 
from public or private sources.”75 They also differentiate amongst 
several factors of institutional and intellectual nature. Institutional 
independence is affected by funding modality, a clarified mission 
statement, internal management autonomy, an enlarged circle of 
beneficiaries, regulated links with a donor/ international organizations, 
accountability and external auditing. Furthermore, intellectual 
                                        
73 Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12. 
74 Diane Stone and Heidi Ullrich, "Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks in 
Western: Development Trends and Perspectives," Local Government and 
Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute 24(2003): 7, 8. 
75 Magued Osman and Nesreen El Molla, "The Politics of Independence. Can 
Government Think Tanks Act Independently? ," in International Conference 
on the Role of Think Tanks in Developing Countries: Challenges and 
Solutions (Cairo 2009), 7. 
  
 
 
independence consists of setting own agendas, academic excellence and 
quality assurance, “advisory firewall”, openness and publicity for the 
image of the building and prestige.76  
A specific aspect of organizational autonomy is underlined by 
Enrique Mendizabal, in whose opinion think tanks should be able to 
decide their political affiliations, ideological stance and supporting 
parties or persons accordingly to their will.77 Mendizabal thinks that in 
the states where the think tank sector is not well-developed and rooted, 
such forms of independence may well encounter resistance, although:  
The idea of independence as non-affiliation is 
damaging for think tanks in developing countries. It 
leads them to think that the only way of achieving 
it is to let the research speak for itself avoid any 
close relationships with political or economic 
powers, and this can, in some cases, stop them from 
exploring new ways of fulfilling their missions. 
Striking the right balance will not be easy -and in 
some contexts may be well beyond the capacity of 
the think tank itself- but not trying is not a sign of 
independence; on the contrary, it suggests that the 
think tank has its hands tied to one single path. 78   
Conclusions 
                                        
76 Ibid., 7-13. 
77 Enrique Mendizabal, "Independence, Dependency, Autonomy… Is It All About 
the Money?," in On think tanks (2011). 
78 Ibid. 
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Over the last twenty years, the think tank sector in Poland has 
been developing and self-strengthening. Various obstacles of financial, 
cultural or organizational nature do not change the fact that think tanks 
have become (to be considered) an important voice in public debate and 
policy making. With this process of transformation, think tanks in have 
Poland faced “the formidable task of teaching government [as well as the 
media, academics and business, one might add] who they are and how 
they can help”.79 However, at the same time, they had to – and still have 
to – answer these questions themselves and for themselves.  
While constructing their identity as an organization, the spheres 
of science and politics serve as the main reference points for think tanks 
– not only in Poland. They constitute both a backup or reservoir, and a 
target. Therefore, constant “boundary work”, and the act of balancing 
between “the scientific” and “the political” takes place. Although each 
                                        
79 Johnson, "Central Europe’s Think Tanks: A Voice for Reform," 10. However, 
one could argue that the task was even more challenging and consisted of 
convincing both politicians and public opinion of the importance of expertise in 
general. In fact, consulting external expert sources is still regarded as a kind of 
extravagance or wastefulness in Poland. For example, some time ago the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs came under fire for commissioning several think 
tanks to prepare policy analyses. The fact that diverse institutes were asked to 
draft parallel proposals evoked surprise amongst TV journalists. The Ministry's 
speaker had to explain that diversifying the knowledge base for political 
decisions may be indeed useful. At the same time, members of state analytic 
institutions complain about the lack of interest on the part of politicians. 
Government has no habit of ordering studies or listening to external experts. 
Although there are sins committed both on the supply and demand side of 
policy advice in Poland, most of the blame is attributed to politicians and their 
know-it-all attitude. See Wojciech Lorenz and Tatiana Serwetnyk, "Czy Politycy 
Zaczną Doceniać Ekspertów," Rzeczpospolita, 26.01. 2008; Wawrzyniec 
Smoczyński, "Raport O Think Tankach. Myślą I Rządzą," Polityka 2009. 
  
 
 
specific organization tries to find its own balance, most think tanks in 
Poland choose the warning coloration of science-based “neutrality” and 
therefore avoid any ideological and political declarations.  
Although in the collective characteristics of Polish think tanks the 
“scientific” element seems to dominate the “political” element, the latter 
is important in terms of gaining influence on politics, but also on policy. 
As Stone and Ulrich explained it, “Think tanks or policy institutes need 
to have some kind of engagement with government if they are to 
succeed in influencing policy. However, their desire to preserve 
intellectual autonomy means that most institutes try to strike a delicate 
balance between dependence on government and total isolation from 
it.”80 It is beyond any discussion that the task of “influencing the 
influentials […] without being influenced by them” 81 requires a lot of 
effort. For this reason, think tanks’ independence may be understood as 
actually keeping an appropriate distance. Too narrow political ties may 
result in political bias of the research and the lost of autonomy. An 
excessive distance, on the other hand, may make even the best policy 
research useless and unused.82  
Think tanks are thus doomed to be “politically apolitical”. As 
Adam Bodnar and Jacek Kucharczyk, two top Polish think tankers put it: 
“We understand being apolitical as an indispensable distance from 
political parties and independence from the government. It does not 
                                        
80 Stone and Ullrich, "Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks in Western: 
Development Trends and Perspectives," 7. 
81 Osman and Molla, "The Politics of Independence. Can Government Think 
Tanks Act Independently? ," 10. 
82 Eric C. Johnson, "How Think Tanks Improve Public Policy," Economic 
Reform Today 3(1996): 35. 
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mean that we dissociate ourselves from the influence on the politics of 
the public authorities. But we try to do so from independent and expert 
positions that result from the values – political values as well – related to 
the mission of our organizations.”83   
Due to the fact that think tanks are hybrid organizations84 
operating at the intersection of various spheres that they are supposed 
to bridge, their independence needs to be regarded as “managing 
distance”. On the one hand, “[s]trong connections might limit the 
intellectual independence of researchers by politicizing their research 
priorities”, while on the other hand, “too much distance between a think 
tank and government may result in research irrelevant to 
policymaking.”85 To a large degree, the same can be said to apply to the 
links with the media or with business.  
 
                                        
83 Adam Bodnar and Jacek Kucharczyk, "Romantycznie I Rozważnie," Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 19. 01. 2010. 
84 See Medvetz, "Think Tanks as an Emergent Field." 
85 Johnson, "How Think Tanks Improve Public Policy," 35. 
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The position and role of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – selected issues 
 
 
Abstract 
The subject of this article is the post of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The author discuss about the position and role 
of the HR, paying attention to the potential conflicts associated with 
his competences. The last part of this article is about the role of HR 
as a representative of the European Union on the international stage. 
It will be presented Catherine Ashton activity in this area, as a HR. 
Keywords: High Representative, European Union external relations, 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, Treaty of 
Lisbon 
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Introduction 
 The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (the High Representative, HR) created by the Treaty of 
Lisbon1 is a body of the European Union (EU) responsible for carrying 
out the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European 
Security and Defence Policy. The responsibilities of the HR were 
previously held by two separate posts of the European Union: the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Commissioner for External Relations. The Treaty of Lisbon puts all of 
the powers related to common foreign and security and defence policy 
into one person’s hands. The aim was to improve the coherence, 
effectiveness and visibility of the EU’s external action2. This holistic 
approach cannot be efficiently implemented without changes in the EU’s 
machinery and its institutional structures. Personal connection of the 
High Representative with the Commissioner for External Relations and 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) made by the Treaty of 
Lisbon would allow the integration of the security, political, social and 
                                        
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007. 
2
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon
_treaty/ai0009_en.htm (accessed November 15, 2013). See also: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ashton (accessed November 15, 2013); EU External 
Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, ed. Paul James Cardwell, 
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, p. 6; Beata Przybylska-Maszner, Spory 
kompetencyjne wokół urzędu Wysokiego Przedstawiciela Unii 
Europejskiej do Spraw Zagranicznych i Polityki Bezpieczeństwa, „Studia 
Europejskie“, no. 2, 2012, p. 33. 
  
 
 
economic dimensions in all foreign policies, from their creation to the 
implementation and evaluation3.  
 The post discussed in this article was introduced by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam as the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and was occupied by Javier Solana for ten years. It was 
much more limited in scope than the present one created by the Treaty 
of Lisbon4. There is no doubt that the High Representative with a 
stronger mandate would increase the EU’s diplomatic capacity and 
strengthen the leadership in the EU’s foreign policy. Although the new 
powers attributed by the Lisbon Treaty to the HR have enhanced the 
chances of this institution to contributing to this vision, the appointment 
of Catherine Ashton from the United Kingdom seems to leave space for 
and the burden of developing this vision in the hands of national 
leaders. During the first months in office, Ashton has been criticized for 
failing to boost EU visibility on the world stage on major policy dossiers 
and for missing key meetings with national ministries. However, political 
commentators have recognized her strong determination in establishing 
the EEAS. Thus, whether really she can be regarded as a “name and 
face” on European Union policy abroad? 
Competences and responsibilities of the High Representative 
 According to the article 18 paragraph 1 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the High Representative is appointed for a five-
                                        
3 Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth, Bastian Giegerich, Europe: a Time for Strategy, 
„Egmont Paper“, no. 27, 2009, p. 11. 
4 See: The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Assessing Europe’s Role in 
the World, ed. Federiga Bindi, Washington: Brookings Institution Press 
Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 34-35; Beata Przybylska-Maszner, Spory 
kompetencyjne..., p. 37-40. 
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year term by the European Council which elects him by a qualified 
majority voting with an agreement of the President of the European 
Commission. His choice must be approved by the European Parliament. 
Term of office of this posts may be terminated in the same way. In 
accordance with the Article 5 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions5 
annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the term of office of the High 
Representative is linked to the term of the European Commission.  
 Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the 
European Council has appointed Catherine Ashton as the High 
Representative. Ashton largely unknown to the general public even in 
the United Kingdom had been previously the European Commissioner 
for Trade and otherwise had no foreign affairs experience6. She was 
also criticized because of the lack of charisma, experience in 
diplomacy7, language skills and no command of other foreign languages 
but only English8. Even so, Ashton unexpectedly came to the top of the 
list of the candidates for the HR when she was nominated unanimously 
                                        
5 Protocol on Transitional Provisions, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 159. 
6 Her appointment to this position was a big surprise, because in the political 
couloirs and European writings appeared the names of people known from 
previous political achievements, such as Joschka Fischer or Tony Blair. About 
controversies related to the appointment Ashton for the position of HR see: 
Beata Przybylska-Maszner, Spory kompetencyjne..., p. 40-44. 
7 Before being appointed to the post of HR, Ashton was EU Commissioner for 
Trade (for one year) and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the UK 
Department for Education and Skills. Unlike Javier Solana, ahe has little 
experience in foreign policy and virtually no personal contacts with world’s 
leaders. 
8 The Telegraph wrote that her appointend was “the most ridiculous appointment 
in the history of the European Union”. See: Johannes Langer, Ashton, From 
Zero to Hero, http://johanneslanger.com/2013/12/07/ashton-from-zero-to-hero 
(accessed November 15, 2013). 
  
 
 
by the centre-left leaders who claimed the post9. Thus, her appointment 
can be understood as the unwillingness  of  the  Member  States  to  
underpin  the  strengthened  position  of  the  HR by  a strong 
personality. 
 With respect to the competencies of the HR, as mentioned 
above, his main role is to conduct the foreign policy of the EU10. He 
combine the previous posts of the High Representative for CFSP and the 
Commissioner for External Relations. This “double hat” and “double 
role” of the High Representative “in some way mirrors the unity of the 
supranational (Commission) and the intergovernmental (Council) logic of 
the Union, it combines in one person the European and the Member 
States’ lines of interest”11. 
 Drawing on his role as Vice-President of the European 
Commission, the High Representative ensures the consistency and 
coordination of the European Union’s external action. He also chairs the 
Foreign Affairs Council and conducts the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Then, with the support of the European External Action Service, 
he is responsible for managing, implementing, and representing CFSP 
decisions. The HR participates actively in the common foreign and 
                                        
9 Andrew Rettman, Little-known British peer emerges as top candidate for 
EU foreign minister, EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/institutional/29022 
(accessed November 15, 2013); Honor Mahony, EU chooses unknowns for new 
top jobs, EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/political/29024 (accessed 
November 15, 2013). 
10 See: Iwona Miedzińska, Wysoki Przedstawiciel Unii do spraw  
Zagranicznych i Polityki Bezpieczeństwa, in: Teoretyczno-metodologiczny 
wymiar badań nad instytucjami Unii Europejskiej, ed. Konstanty Adam 
Wojtaszczyk, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2013, p. 242-243, 254-
259. 
11 Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
Action, „Columbia Journal of European Law“, vol. 15 (3), 2009, p. 399. 
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security and defence policy12. First of all, he contributes to the 
development of that policy by submitting proposals to the Council and 
the European Council13. Then (as a representative of the Council) he 
implements the decisions which has been adopted by the European 
Council and the Council14. Secondly, he also has a duty to represent the 
EU in the international relations. He conducts the political dialogue with 
third countries and is responsible for expressing the EU’s positions, 
representing the EU in the international organisations (such as the 
United Nations) and at international conferences15. 
 Replacing the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and the Commissioner for External Relations, the HR has 
also shared their respective responsibilities16: 
within the Council he is responsible for ensuring the consistency and 
continuity in executing the tasks related to the EU foreign policy. 
For this reason he chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and 
building consensus between the 28 Member States and their 
national priorities, often through monthly meetings of EU foreign 
ministers; 
within the Commission he holds the responsibilities for external 
relations. Otherwise, he is responsible for ensuring coordination 
                                        
12 However, in September 2012, the Daily Telegraph criticised her European 
Commission attendance record reporting that Baroness Ashton had been 
completely absent at 21 out of 32 weekly meetings held so far that year. 
13 Article 18 of the TEU. 
14 Article 27 paragraph 1 of the TEU. 
15 Article 27 paragraph 2 of the TEU. 
16
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon
_treaty/ai0009_en.htm (accessed November 15, 2013). 
  
 
 
between the external policy and the other Commission’s policies 
in relation to different EU’s services and institutions. 
 The High Representative regularly has to consult the European 
Parliament on the main issues related to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. He also 
has to inform the European Parliament about the advancement of these 
policies. His duties include taking account of the Parliament’s opinions. 
In the matter of conducting peace-keeping missions, conflict prevention 
and strengthening international security the HR ensures coordination of 
the civilian and military aspects. According to the article 30 paragraph 2 
of the TEU, in cases requiring a rapid decision he has the right to 
convene (within 48 hours) an extraordinary meeting of the Council as 
his own initiative or at the request of a Member State. With a very 
urgent need it may occur faster. Together with the Council, he shall 
ensure respect for the principles of loyalty and mutual solidarity with 
the EU Member States in the field of the external relations17. 
 However, the High Representative of the Union does not have 
the monopoly on the EU’s external representation. The Treaty of Lisbon 
also gives the responsibility for the representation of the EU beyond to 
the President of the European Council but at a separate level and 
without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. However, 
the text does not specify how the work is to be divided between the 
two allowing practical experience to determine their respective roles. 
While there has been some criticism of the vague division of powers 
between the EU’s top players, Ukrainian ambassador to the EU Andriy 
Veselovsky praised the framework and clarified it in his own terms: 
“The President of the European Commission speaks as the EU’s 
                                        
17 Article 12 paragraph 3 of the TEU. 
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government while the President of the European Council is a strategist’. 
The High Representative specialises in bilateral relations while the 
European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy deals in technical matters such as the free trade agreement with 
Ukraine. The President of the European Parliament meanwhile 
articulates the EU’s values”18.  
 Potential conflicts could occur between the High Representative, 
the President of the European Council and the President of the European 
Commission, because the provisions of Treaty of Lisbon are ambiguous 
with respect to the delimitation of their responsibilities. Institutional 
tensions could be expected firstly between the coordinating function of 
the High Representative and Members of the Commission with 
responsibilities for external policies, and secondly, between the HR and 
the President of the European Council, which may concern the 
particular function of the EU’s external representation19. Despite 
possible conflicts, the Treaty of Lisbon provides a strong institutional 
basis for a more effective European foreign policy, among others 
through the creation of the EEAS. 
 According to the article 27 paragraph 2 of the TEU, the High 
Representative is assisted in the performance of his duties by the 
European External Action Service, which cooperates with the diplomatic 
                                        
18 Andrew Rettman, Ukraine gives positive appraisal of new-model EU, 
EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/ institutional/29680 (accessed November 15, 
2013). 
19 For example these institutional conflicts could occur during the civilian and 
military crisis management missions, in which the EU is engaged all over the 
world. See: Julia Schmidt, The High Representative, the President and the 
Commission—Competing Players in the EU’s External Relations: The Case 
of Crisis Management, in: EU External Relations Law and Policy, p. 161-180. 
  
 
 
services of the Member States. This Service has its legal basis in the 
Article 27 paragraph 3 of the TEU, but its functioning and organisation 
are established by a decision of the Councilacting on a proposal from 
the HR. The Council approved the guidelines on the role and 
functioning of the EEAS in October 200920, in accordance in which the 
EEAS is under the authority of the HR. The HR relies on the Service for 
the preparation of proposals relating to the external policy of the EU 
and for the implementation of decisions adopted by the Council in this 
area of integration21. The European External Action Service may also 
be placed at the disposal of the President of the European Council, the 
President of the Commission and the other Commissioners for the issues 
connected with the EU external policy. However, the EEAS is unique 
and independent from the other EU institutions, formed by merger of the 
external relation departments of the Council and the European 
Commission and it also has its own budget. 
 As mentioned above, there are multiple actors representing the 
EU abroad: the Presidency in office, the High Representative, the 
Commission president, and the commissioner charged with external 
relations, who often present conflicting views. The Treaty of Lisbon 
would clearly help streamline representation by reducing the number of 
actors, though it still remains to be seen how many of the new actors 
work in practice. However, The Treaty of Lisbon bring two main 
benefits to EU foreign policy: the creation of an EU diplomatic service 
                                        
20 Presidency report to the European Council on the European External Action 
Service, http://register.consilium. europa.eu (accessed November 15, 2013). 
21 See: Chiara Cellerino, The new European External Action Service and the 
Lisbon call for coherence of European External Action: issues of 
accountability and scope, „The Columbia Journal of European Law“, no. 22, 
2011. 
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and the attribution of a “legal personality” to the EU22. This allow the 
EU to enter into binding treaties, which should clarify and streamline the 
EU’s ability to make external agreement. 
The High Representative on the international stage 
 Generally, it is widely known about unfortunate start of Ashton’s 
office, her lack of charisma, experience in diplomacy, lack of orientation 
in the Eastern Policy, her lack of coordination (for example during 
providing aid after the earthquake Haiti) and the lack of the determined 
reaction to social protests in Tunisia, Libya or Egypt23. She was 
criticised for not visiting Haiti, after the earthquake of January 2010, and 
for not having promptly issued declarations enhancing the visibility of 
her role and of EU foreign policy after the emergence of the Middle East 
spring. However, it should be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon improves 
the preconditions for a higher degree of coherence in European external 
relations and strengthens the EU as an international actor, even if the 
success of the European foreign policy, still depends to a great extent on 
the Member States’ ability and willingness to cooperate. 
 Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Ashton chaired a meeting of 
the foreign relations, development and environment Directorates-
General and experts from the Council and the Situation Centre (the EU 
intelligence-gathering agency). They all agreed on several matters: to 
                                        
22 The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Assessing..., p. 344. 
23 See: Iwona Miedzińska, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa 
Unii Europejskiej, in: Traktat z Lizbony – wybrane zagadnienia, ed. Maria 
Magdalena Kenig-Witkowska, Robert Grzeszczak, Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie 
Absolwentów Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 
2012, p. 171-172. 
  
 
 
give an immediate aid of €3 million, to look for further financial 
assistance, to send personnel to assess the situation and to coordinate 
pledges from Member States. Ashton also chaired a further meeting of 
Member States ambassadors and acted as a general coordinator (e.g. 
contacts from the UN went via Ashton). Although she refused to 
describe it as the first act of the external action service, Ashton did 
emphasise that it was the first time when such a good coordination 
between all the various EU foreign policy actors had ever been 
accomplished24.  
 However, the majority of the aid relief was dealt bilaterally 
between Haiti and the individual Member States25 and Ashton was 
criticised afterwards for being one of the very few foreign 
representatives not to travel to Haiti personally26. Despite EU ministers 
steps such as agreeing to deploy European gendarmes to keep peace on 
the island, criticism was levied at Ashton for failing to improve the EU’s 
international profile during the crisis. Ashton replied stating that 
“There’s been a recognition from the people of Haiti, the United States, 
the United Nations and others of the extremely important role the EU 
has played. On the main issue, we should ask, have we tried to save 
lives, to support the people of Haiti? Yes we have”27. 
                                        
24 Spain, which held the rotating Council presidency that would have taken 
charge before the Treaty of Lisbon, took a back seat though assisted, for 
example by offering use of the Spanish base in Panama. 
25 Andrew Rettman, EU foreign relations chief tests new powers in earthquake 
response, EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/foreign/29266 (accessed 
November 11, 2012). 
26 Honor Mahony, Ashton under fire for not going to Haiti, EUobserver, 
http://euobserver.com/news/29299 (accessed November 11, 2012). 
27 Andrew Rettman, EU to send gendarmerie force to Haiti, Euobserver, 
http://euobserver.com/foreign/29336 (accessed November 11, 2012). 
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 Criticism continued to mount, including complaints that Ashton 
skipped a defence meeting in order to attend the inauguration of 
Ukraine’s Prime Minister28, alleged bias towards British officials, that she 
has no language skills and risked a UK-French feud over creating an EU 
military planning headquarters29. Notwithstanding, she has been 
defended by some, including Commissioner Günther Oettinger on the 
ground that she has had to take on a job that combines three previous 
jobs and is working on establishing the EEAS so she is unable to take on 
everything at once, nor please everyone30. Despite early Spanish 
assistance during 2010, Ashton did find herself competing with the 
Spanish foreign minister on who was going to be speaking for the EU31 
and the need to find consensus between the Member States and 
institutions pushed back the expected operational date of the EEAS from 
spring 2010 to December 201032. In contrast to the Spanish position, in 
                                        
28 Martin Banks, Criticism of Ashton is ’unfair’, theParliament.com, 
http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/new-
commissioner-defends-ashton-amid-unfair-criticism (accessed November 11, 
2012). 
29 Ian Traynor, Ashton defends start in EU foreign policy role, The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2010/mar/10/lady-ashton-military-
headquarters-brussels (accessed November 11, 2012). 
30 Martin Banks, Criticism of Ashton is ’unfair’, theParliament.com, 
http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/newsarticle/new-
commissioner-defends-ashton-amid-unfair-criticism (accessed November 11, 
2012). 
31 Andrew Rettman, Poland to showcase its EU credentials in Brussels 
extravaganza, EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/institutional/30236 (accessed 
November 11, 2012). 
32 Honor Mahony, Negotiators rush to get EU diplomatic service ready, 
EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/ news/30238 (accessed November 11, 2012). 
  
 
 
2011 Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski said he would act as 
Ashton’s “loyal deputy”33. 
 Secretary General Pierre Vimont joined those defending Ashton 
from criticism and praised her work during the opening of the EEAS 
office in Benghazi, Libya, as making the EEAS very popular in Libya. He 
has also supported her over Syria and asked her to stand for a second 
term. Polish Minister for Europe Mikolaj Dowgielewicz also stated that 
the criticism against Ashton was “a lot of hot air” and that “she has an 
impossible job to do and she is doing it well. At the end of her time in 
office, people will be more positive about what she has done. She will 
leave a real legacy”34. However, former European Commission adviser 
Dr Fraser Cameron argued that “the criticism one hears of Ashton is 
pretty strong and it will be difficult to overcome the bad press she has. 
It represents a problem for the EEAS, when it comes to public 
diplomacy, and reflects the system we have for choosing leaders. Too 
often, the EEAS is waiting until the last member state signs up to the 
position; they could set out a view much earlier. When you look at 
places like Egypt - Cathy has been five times, but people are still not 
quite sure what the EEAS does or who speaks for Europe. The glass is 
less than half full. I think the criticism of Ashton is down to style and 
morale in the EEAS is not as good as it should be”35. 
                                        
33 Andrew Rettman, Polish minister pledges loyalty to EU’s Ashton, 
EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/ pl2011/32580 (accessed November 11, 2012). 
34 Dean Carroll, Catherine Ashton for a second term at the EEAS?, Public 
Service Europe, http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/811/catherine-
ashton-for-a-second-term-at-the-eeas (accessed November 11, 2012). 
35 Dean Carroll, Catherine Ashton for a second term... (accessed November 11, 
2012). 
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  In spite of that, starting from the second half of 2010 the 
criticism of Ashton died down, however UE is still a great absent in the 
world’s most important matters. Baroness Ashton tends to be only an 
arranger of the EU Member States relations36. This is due to the fact that 
the High Representative is responsible for only co-ordinating the EU’s 
foreign policy and building consensus between Member States. The 
HR’s specific powers are largely undefined and are likely to be shaped 
by Catherine Ashton and the next people holding this post in the coming 
years. Moreover, actual decisions on CFSP are still made by Member 
States in the European Council. There was an agreement here that 
involved the EU in peacekeeping in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Congo in 2003, as well as observer missions in Gaza (2004) and 
Indonesia (2005). In April 2007, EU foreign ministers agreed to implement 
sanctions against Iran following its refusal to halt uranium enrichment. 
In 2008, sanctions were imposed against Zimbabwe following a violent 
and undemocratic Presidential election, and the EU launched its first 
maritime operation to prevent piracy off the coast of Somalia. The 
European Council also issues ’common strategies’ on issues about which 
Members States agree, many as part of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). These include strategies on promoting democracy and 
peace in Russia, the eastern Mediterranean and the Ukraine. The EU 
has diplomatic missions in several important countries, under the 
authority of the High Representative. 
                                        
36 She has used this deadline in pronouncement from 12 january 2011 during 
meeting with the socialist in European Parliament, saying about possible EU’s 
operation on international scene. 
  
 
 
 However, the criticism of Ashton has stopped, 2013 was a year of 
changed perceptions on Ashton and her leadership skills, thanks to 
successes to reach deals between Kosovo and Serbia and most recently 
her firm pursuit of a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program has won her a 
lot of good press and history’s verdict seems to change about her. 
Ashton herself has shown the skill to patiently broker this important 
deal that was considered by many as simply impossible. Her ability to 
stay on the sidelines has proven an asset in the negotiation room. In 
May 2012, Ashton was honoured with the BusinessMed Blue Award, 
which was presented to her in recognition of her efforts in promoting 
peace and economic development in the Mediterranean region37. 
Another success Ashton was that she has formally launched the EEAS 
on 1 December 2010 at a low key event where she outlined the relations 
with the United States and China, climate change, poverty eradication, 
crisis management and counter-terrorism as her key priorities38. Her 
determination in start-up of the EEAS seems to confirm Ashton’s 
preference for institutions rather than for policies, something that may 
lead her to contribute more to EU bureaucratic rather than security 
culture. 
 After more than four years of functioning post of HR’s, comments 
on the appointment of Ashton and her activity on the international stage 
are still vary. On the one hand, she is referred to as a weak figure 
because of her lack of visible experience for the post of foreign policy 
chief. On the other hand, her previous experience as a  Commissioner  
                                        
37 See: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ashton. 
38 Andrew Rettman, Ashton names EU foreign-service priorities at low-key 
launch event, EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/institutional/31413 (accessed 
November 11, 2012). 
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for  Trade  may change the working style in the field of the CFSP in 
favour of a greater consideration of the European interests, because as a 
member of the European Commission, she worked in the EU’s 
supranational institution and was accustomed to advocate the European 
idea and European interests39. 
Conclusion 
 With regard to the EU’s foreign policy, the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced three major institutional innovations: the post of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the 
position of the President of the European Council and the European 
External Action Service. The post of the HR intends to put a “name and 
face” on the EU policy abroad and help the EU become a capable, 
coherent and strategic global actor. Thus, with the growing role of the 
High Representative and his exclusion from the European Council, the 
national foreign ministers are now uncertain of their role in relation to 
this institution. At an informal meeting in Finland it was mooted that 
they could serve as special envoys on the High Representative’s behalf. 
This has been backed by Ashton who said that so long as the EU spoke 
with one voice it didn’t matter who was speaking40. These words shake 
                                        
39 Kateryna Koehler, European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the 
EU as an International Actor, „Caucasian Review of International Affairs“, no. 
4(1), 2010, p. 67. 
40 Honor Mahony, EU foreign ministers ponder their post-Lisbon role, 
EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/institutional/29676 (accessed November 15, 
2013). By the contrast, while he was presenting his European Security Strategy 
as a High Representative Solana noted that “Une Europe plus forte dotée d’une 
vision stratégique commune, c’est ausi une Europea capable de consolider ses 
  
 
 
the purpose of the reform introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. They 
show that the High Representative is not and in the nearest future will 
not be somebody that Henry Kissinger was waiting for: the one it will 
be possible to call to asking about the position of the European Union. It 
is still not a phone number to talk to Europe. 
 As is apparent from the above, in this area of integration 
Member States are united only in a theory but in practice they are still 
strongly divided. The differences among them are to some extent 
unavoidable because each Member State has its individual history that 
affects its interests and national foreign policy which are in these 
conditions repeatedly hard to reconcile with other Member States and 
the EU’s institutions. This leads to the general conclusion: the EU will 
continue to be “an economic giant and at the same time a political and 
military dwarf”41 in international relations. Thus, even more 
harmonisation between national foreign policies needs to be done to 
have a coherent and effective EU foreign policy. Firstly, they were 
consistent with the objectives of protecting EU citizens and external 
representation. Ashton as a HR represented the EU position at several 
occasions, even though this position was due to manifold different 
opinions of the Member States not always easy to define. However 
concrete decisions, e.g. sanctions, lead to a minimal common position, 
which was represented externally. 
                                                                                                
relations à la fois avec leas autres grands acteurs (…) et avec les autres grandes 
organsations”. 
41 Dariusz Milczarek, Foreign and security policy – a challenge and a strategic 
choice for the European Union of the 21st Century, in: EUROPE – The 
Global Challenges, ed. Antoni Kukliński, Krzysztof Pawłowski, Nowy Sącz: 
Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu National Louis University, 2005, p. 138. 
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 Ashton is able to do so with “quiet diplomacy” in the world’s hot 
spots. In comparison to her activist predecessor Javier Solana, she 
deliberately sought a much lower profile as the EU’s first foreign policy 
chief. However, in diplomacy sometimes it is more important to be silent 
and rather manage the process. Although she might not say so much as 
others, people close to her say that she can sum up, synthesize and put 
forward ideas for the next step – all what doing a good diplomat, also 
on the highest level. Despite the improvements of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EU can still only provide mechanisms to facilitate consensus when it 
comes to CFSP. Eventually, the High Representative works with the 
mandate provided by the Member States: he can encourage them 
consensus, but he cannot force it on them. 
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